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I. INTRODUCTION
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hands of
vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law, is one of
the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason.
-Justice Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Chief of
Counsel at the Nuremberg Trials'
In one of history's more brutal ironies, the treaty that established the
Nuremberg trials-power's celebrated tribute to reason-was signed by the
t BA (Hons) (Melb); 1997 Australian Rhodes Scholar and Probationer Research Student in Law
at Oxford University from October 1997. I would like to thank Timothy McCormack, Wayne Morgan,
Gerry Simpson, John Chesterman, Aruna Pavithran, and the editorial staff of the Journal for their critical
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MILTARY TRIBUNAL SrTING AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY 49 (1946) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS].
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Allies on the same day that the United States dropped the second atomic bomb
on Japan.2
The traditional reading of the Nuremberg trials as the supplication of power
before reason has long distorted the political function that this juridical
resolution to the Second World War played in reestablishing order. Commonly
viewed as either the foundation of modem international humanitarian law or an
ugly example of "victor's justice," the trials may be more properly seen as the
emergence of law as ordering principle. The analysis of this relation between
law and order-law as order-is the subject of this Article.
The historical emergence of international criminal law has been driven
largely by tragedy. As a result, the development of norms for the ordering of
violence has been primarily reactive. In Part I, I argue that although this body
of law evolved with no real theory of what it was doing, sense can be made of
it by reference to the function that it serves and the order that it legitimates.
First, however, I will rehearse a brief history of war crimes and the legal
contradictions to which they have given rise. In light of these contradictions, I
will argue that the justification of war-crimes trials must be located not in law
but in the notions of order that at once provide their rhetorical legitimation and
normative telos. This is seen most clearly in the performative function that war
crimes serve (as "theater"), demonstrating a return to order. But this order
cannot be understood as the simple opposition of power and reason, violence
and law, as Justice Jackson suggested. Instead, as I will argue, this conception
of order is gendered in two important ways. First, though it claims to equate
order through law ("peace") with the absence of violence, it is actually
premised on a "public" order that is defined through its relationship with
violence. Secondly, it constitutes within that order a discernibly "public"
morality; this in turn affirms a subjectivity that is implicitly ungendered but
presumes a certain relation to the world that may be termed masculine.
The partiality of this dominant account provides the historico-theoretical
framework for the analysis of the problematic war crime of rape in Part M.
Rape is chosen not merely for its currency in the context of the ongoing trials
relating to events in the former Yugoslavia, but because it highlights a critical
point of tension in the nascent international criminal regime. For a variety of
reasons, rape has been accepted (if not explicitly condoned) as a concomitant
of war. Where it has been proscribed, this has been in terms that sterilize the
gendered nature of the crime and mask the reflection that it casts on the
peculiarly masculine nature of most armed conflict. And yet rape remains an
ambiguous war crime because it also marks the scar between the private and the
public in times of conflict; it is at once an intimate violation of a woman and a
grotesque public display of domination. Such dualisms provide a theme for the
2. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S.
279 (the date in the Japanese time zone was Aug. 9, 1945); see Gerry Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical
Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRum: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 1, 4 (Timothy
L.H. McCormack & Gerry Simpson eds., 1997) [hereinafter THE LAW op WAR CRIMES].
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analysis of the gendered nature of war crimes that is the focus of this paper.
Ultimately, I argue that the experiences of the former Yugoslavia demand a
reconceptualization of war crimes that calls into question the modalities of
power that legitimate the violence of the state, both at peace and at war.
The ongoing trials in the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia serve as a
constant backdrop to these excursions, which have implications at once
theoretical and practical. In this light, the Tribunal marks a decidedly uncertain
step forward in the development of international criminal law in general, and
the protection of women's (human) rights in particular. Although the Tribunal
has given unprecedented centrality to the experiences of women in war, it is by
no means clear that it will be able to "do justice" to those experiences.
Lastly, by way of introduction, I note my own stake in this problem. Much
has been written about the dangers of men speaking for feminism, or for
women.3 This is in no way my aim. As I will argue, it is the silences of certain
voices that define the problem I seek to explore in international criminal law.
I do not seek to fill these silences. Rather, I aim to speak around them, to them,
and in doing so, to bring into question the partiality of those voices that are
heard.4
II. THE FUNCTION OF WAR CRIMES: HISTORY, THEATER, ORDER
The refuge of the defendants can be only their hope that International Law will lag so far
behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is crime in the moral sense must be
regarded as innocent in law.
-Justice Robert H. Jackson
Although prescribed rules for the conduct of hostilities can be found in
most ancient human civilizations,6 and documented prosecutions of persons for
3. See, e.g., MENINMFEMNM (Alice Jardine & Paul Smith eds., 1987). For a general introduction
to feminist legal methods, see generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. Rnv.
829 (1990).
4. Another major difficulty in analyzing events such as those in the former Yugoslavia is the
representation of atrocity. I respect but do not entirely agree with the argument that repetitive serial
representations of such atrocities must "irrevocably [place] the reader in the position of voyeur." BEVERLY
ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNiA-H EGOVINA AND CROATIA 32 (1996). I
believe that it is vital that these stories be told, and that the risks attendant even to a sincere, sober account
are less than the risks of falling into (another) convenient silence.
5. ROBERT JACKSON, THE NORNBER CASE 94 (Cooper Square Publishers 1971) (1947).
6. See generally Timothy L.H. McCormack, From Sun Tzu to the Sixh Committee: The Evolution
of an International Criminal Law Regime, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, supra note 2, at 31 (discussing
evolution of international criminal law). Examples of early writings on humanitarian limitations on the
conduct of hostilities are found in Sun Tzu's The Art of War, written in the sixth century B.C. See THE
COMPLETE ART OF WAR (Ralph D. Sawyer trans., 1996) (including text of The Art of War and Sun Pin's
Military Methods). Herodotus described an incident in ancient Greece in which enemy envoys were killed
as "confessedly a transgression of the [laws of men], as a law of the human race generally, and not merely
as a law applicable exclusively to the barbarians." See M. Cant BASSIOUNI, CRImS AGAINST HUMANITY
IN INTEINATIONAL CRMnNAL LAW 154 n.16 (1992) (quoting Herodotus). In 405 B.C., Xenephon wrote of
an incident during the 24-year war between Athens and Sparta, when the Spartan leader Lysander called
together his Allies to determine the fate of Athenians who had agreed, inter alia, to cut off the hands of
captured prisoners. Maridakis argues that in doing so, Lysander in effect constituted a war crimes tribunal.
See Georges S. Maridakis, Un Prdcddent du Procs de Nuremberg 7r de l'Histoire de la Grce Ancienne,
302 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:299
violating accepted limitations on the conduct of armed conflict are found in the
Middle Ages,7 the history of international criminal law can be traced back only
a few hundred years. The earliest example that is often cited is the trial of Peter
Von Hagenbach in 1474, convicted by a tribunal of twenty-eight judges from
Austria and its allies for crimes against the "laws of God and man," following
his reign of terror over the citizens of BreisachA The value of the case as a
precedent for subsequent trials is questionable, however, as the judges and laws
were restricted to those of the allied States of the Holy Roman Empire.9
International law as such did not exist until Europe emerged from the
medieval period and the vertically structured hierarchies under Pope and
Emperor came to be replaced by the horizontally organized system of sovereign
states, formally established in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. 10 The treaty
affirmed the right of rulers to determine the confessional allegiance of their
states and subjects (cujus regio, ejus religio)n and the corresponding secular
supremacy of territorial rulers over their dominions (Rex in regno suo est
Imperator regni sui).11 As a result, the (European) world was reformulated not
merely in its political structure, but in its conception of the universe on which
that structure was laid. 3
The emergence of international law in such a system was based less in legal
5 REVUE HEL±NIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1 (1952), cited in McCormack, supra. Similar histories
can be found in Hindu, Roman, and Islamic societies. See C.E. BRAND, ROMAN MILITARY LAW 195-96
(1968) (detailing articles of war of Emperor Maurice); K.P. JAYASWAL, MANU AND YAJMAVALKYA-A
COMPARISON AND A CONTRAST: A TREATIE ON THE BASIc HINDU LAw 106-07 (1930); MAnD KIHADDURI,
WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF IsLAM 83-87 (1955) (detailing rules governing jihad).
7. See BAssloum, supra note 6, at 158-60, 196-97; JOSEPH W. BISHOP JR., JUSICE UNDER FIRE:
A STUDY OF MILITARY LAw 4 (1974); M.H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN TE LATE MIDDLE ArES 7-63
(1965); cf. WLAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY THE FIF=H act 4, sc. 7, in 10 THE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE 405 (AMS Press 1970) (James 0. Halliwell ed., 1861) ("Kill the poys and the luggagel 'tis
expressly against the law of arms: 'tis as arrant a piece of knavery... as can be offered."); Theodor
Meron, Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992). For a complete
examination of the law of war and Shakespeare's works, see THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND
SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAw OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1993).
8. See BASsiOuNI, supra note 6, at 416; 2 GEORO SCHwARZENBEROER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COuRTs AND TRtmuNAIs 462-66 (1968).
9. See 2 ScEWARzENBERGER, supra note 8, at 463; McCormack, supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, ImERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 34-38 (1986)
(describing birth of present international community after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia); B.V.A. R6ling,
Are Grotius' Ideas Obsolete in an Expanded World?, in Huco GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
281, 281-89 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990); cf Hedley Bull, The Importance of Grotius in the Study of
International Relations, in HUGO GROTtuS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra, at 65, 75 (discussing
existence of states prior to Peace of Westphalia, but distinguishing nation-states which did not emerge until
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). For a post-culturalist discussion of the implications of the development
of international relations, see James Der Derian, The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International
Relations, in INTERNATIONA/IINTERTEXTUAL RELATIONS: POSTMODERN READINGS OF WORLD POLrricS 3
(James Der Derian & Michael Shapiro eds., 1989).
11. See Bull, supra note 10, at 76-77.
12. See John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 157 (1993).
13. See Simon Chesterman, Law, Subject and Subjectivity in International Relations: International
Law and the Postcolony, 20 MELB. U. L. REv. 979, 988-93 (1996).
1997] Gender of War Crimes
doctrine than it was in a body of principles rooted in the "law of nature.""4
Laws governing the conduct of war continued to develop, but the content varied
from state to state and prosecutions were inconsistent.' 5 One of the first
attempts to codify the laws of war was the United States' Lieber Code,' 6 but it
was not until the adoption of the Hague Conventions of 189911 and 190718 that
the subjects of the international legal system agreed to international laws of war
binding on states. At the same time,. despite the lack of collective machinery to
enforce the conventions, there was evidence of a growing awareness of the
humanitarian obligations on states19 and of demands for criminal sanctions in
response to their violation.'
It was not until the First World War, however, that widespread calls were
made for the trial of those responsible for perpetrating atrocities of
unprecedented brutality.21 There were numerous instances of war-crimes trials
held by individual Allied States, 22 but it was Turkey's attempts to exterminate
the Armenians that garnered support for truly international action." In May
14. See Huco GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 599 (James Brown Scott ed. & Francis W.
Kelsey trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1625). This international society centered around the
understanding that States and their rulers are "bound by rules and form a society or community with one
another, of however rudimentary a kind." Bull, supra note 10, at 71. This conception, which Bull came to
call the "anarchical society" of States, provided an alternative world view to both the entirely chaotic state
of nature as described by Machiavelli and later Hobbes, and the attempts to bring this chaos under
centralized control by restoring the institutions of Latin Christendom, or through the construction of new
institutions seeking a perpetual peace through human progress as ultimately articulated by Immanuel Kant.
This principle is echoed in Grotius' statements on the conduct of war: "What is permissible in war is viewed
either absolutely or in relation to a previous promise. It is viewed absolutely, first from the standpoint of
the law of nature, and then from that of the law of nations." GROTIUs, supra, at 599.
15. See McCormack, supra note 6; c. THOMAS HOBBES, LvIATHAN 141 (Richard Tucker ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651).
16. The Lieber Code, drawn up by Francis Lieber, was published in 1863 as the military code for
the Union Army during the American Civil War. The Lieber Code: Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field by Order of the Secretary of War (1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code],
reprinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 158 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter
LAw OF WAR]. Although the Lieber Code was not an international document, it was a significant influence
on the Hague Conventions that were completed at the turn of the century. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE
ANATOMY OF THE NuREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEmoIR 10 (1992).
17. Convention concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre [Convention With Respect to
the Laws and Customs of War on Land], July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser.
2) 949 [hereinafter First Hague, II].
18. Convention concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre [Convention With Respect to
the Laws and Customs of War on Land], Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser.
3) 461 [hereinafter Second Hague, IV].
19. See, e.g., ERIK CASTRIN, THE PRESENT LAw OF WAR AND NEuTRAuTY 20-22 (1954)
(discussing efforts to codify law of war); JAMES WILFORD GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE WORLD
WAR 19-35 (1920) (analyzing binding nature of Hague Conventions and Declaration of London).
20. See, e.g., JAMES F. WILIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF
PUNISHING WAR CRMIINALS OF THE FntST WORLD WAR 8-22 (1982) (discussing early calls for trial of
German war criminals).
21. See, e.g., ERic HoaSBAwM, AGE OF ExrTEMES: THE SHORT TWENTIEH CENTURY 1914-1991,
at 24-31, 49-50 (1994) (discussing unprecedented scale and barbarism of First World War as opening act
of twentieth century).
22. See BASsIoUNI, supra note 6, at 201-02.
23. See ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING VORLD 71-74 (1990) (comparing
international response to Turkish genocide of Armenians with response to Nazi genocide of Jews and
Gypsies); Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War
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1915, the Allies issued a joint declaration that condemned the massacres and
stated: "In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and
civilization, the Allied governments announce publicly... that they will hold
personally responsible... all members of the Ottoman government and those
of their agents who are implicated in such massacres."24 Despite the
significance of the declaration in introducing the notion of "crimes... against
humanity,"' the failure of the Allies to make good on their threats found a
monument in Hitler's chilling dictum: "Who, after all, speaks today of the
annihilation of the Armenians?"'
The Treaty of Versailles, signed at the end of the war, contained provisions
for an international tribunal that was to try the German Emperor for "a supreme
offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties," and other
persons "accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws of war."27
The proposed tribunal never met, however, with Dutch authorities refusing to
extradite the former Emperor after the war, alleging that the offenses with
which he was charged were political and not punishable under Dutch law. 8 As
a compromise measure, the Allies accepted an offer by Germany to try a select
number of persons in Germany.29 The Leipzig Trials that followed saw only
twelve trials, with six acquittals and a maximum sentence of four years'
imprisonment." Although some commentators have pointed to the positive
aspects of the German Court's preparedness to apply the "Law of Nations" as
part of German domestic law,"1 the results of the trials were so unsatisfactory
to the Allies that they dropped the matter.32 The trials are now discounted as a
"judicial farce. "3
The failure of the Leipzig trials provided a major impetus for interwar
IArmenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'LL. 221, 223-29 (1989).
24. Dadrian, supra note 23, at 262.
25. See BAssioumN, supra note 6, at 168.
26. KnvORK B. BAAKiAN, HmrLai AND THE ARMENIAN GENocmE 2 (1985). Following the
conclusion of the war, the Treaty of S~vres, which included special provisions for the trial of those
responsible for the Armenian massacre, was never ratified. The Treaty of Lausanne, which replaced it,
included a "Declaration of Amnesty" for crimes committed during the war. Treaty of Peace with Turkey,
July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne].
27. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919, arts.
227-28, 2 Bevans 43, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALLAw 225 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller & Edward
M. Wise eds., 1965) [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
28. See ROBERT WoETZE, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1960).
29. See McCormack, supra note 6, at 48-50. Some commentators have argued that the Allies'
reluctance to prosecute alleged war criminals themselves was based on a fear that such prosecution would
stir an uprising in Germany, or start a new war with the Allies. See Wius, supra note 20, at 113;
WOETZEL, supra note 28, at 31; Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the
1990s, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 223, 225 (1992).
30. See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 27, art. 226.
31. See WILLIS, supra note 20, at 138; McCormack, supra note 6, at 50.
32. See Howard Levie, Criminality in the Law of War, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 233,
234 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
33. See YORAM DINSrEI, THE DEFENCE OF "OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS" IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 11 (1965); see also Sheldon Glueck, War Criminals-Their Prosecution and Punishment, 5 LAW.
GU=L Rnv. 1, 9 (1945) (describing trials as "tragi-comedy").
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attempts to establish an international criminal court,' but more importantly
firmed the Allies' resolve to punish war criminals for the atrocities committed
during the Second World War. 5 It is here that the modern prosecution of
individuals for crimes "against the peace and security of mankind" begins-with
the war-crimes trials par excellence of Nuremberg.
A. War Crimes as History
The preceding historical introduction provides the basis for a brief
discussion of the Nuremberg trials. These trials were important, not merely
because they established the foundations for international criminal law, but also
for the way in which that juridical role was connected to a discrete political
function in demonstrating (and, as I shall argue, constituting) the order that
succeeded the horrors of the Second World War. In this sense, the history of
war-crimes trials can be seen not merely as reactions against the brutality of
war, but also as establishing a particular kind of order that is defined through
its relationship to that violence. In this part, I am concerned with the dominant
history of war crimes: a tragedy in which rape played a very small part. Once
the historico-theoretical framework developed in Part II is in place, I turn in
Part II to the questions of how and why rape has been marginalized in that
history. The answers to these questions suggest that focusing on rape may make
it possible to destabilize the categories reified by the international criminal
regime precisely because rape does not fit into them.
The difficulty of analyzing the political and legal issues raised by the
Nuremberg trials is a reflection of the problems associated with speaking about
acts that, for many people, define that which is evil.36 This difficulty revisits the
34. The League of Nations proposed a statute for an international criminal court as part of its
attempt to deal with crimes involving international terrorism during the 1930s. See Report Adopted by the
Committee for International Repression of Terrorism, League of Nations Doe. C.222 M.162 1937 V, app.
H (1937). The Convention did not go into effect, however, because an insufficient number of states ratified
it. See Convention for the Creation ofan International Criminal Court, League of Nations Doe. C.547(1)
M.384(I) 1937 V (1937), reprinted in INTIoNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1909-1945, at 878 (1941) (never
entered into force).
35. The London International Assembly, composed ofdistinguishedjurists representing the fledgling
United Nations, began its work on Nazi war crimes in 1941, taking the first steps toward the prosecution
of war criminals. "The LIA bitterly referred to the lessons of World War I-'[t]he punishment of the war
criminals of World War I was a complete failure'-and noted that its primary objective was the trial and
conviction of all war criminals." BASSiouN, supra note 6, at 179 (quoting LONDON INTERNATIONAL
ASSEMBLY, TnE PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF TnE LONDON INTERNATIONAL
AssEMBLY (1944)). For other early calls for the trial of war criminals, see George Finch, Retribution for
War Crimes, 37 Am. J. INT'L L. 81 (1943); Sheldon Glueck, Tribunalfor War Offenders, 56 HARv. L. RsV.
1059, 1089 (1943).
36. A recent example is provided by the debates surrounding a curious literary hoax in Australia.
A young author writing under the name of Helen Demidenko won a series of literary prizes for her first
novel, The Hand that Signed the Paper (1994). The work ambiguously purported to be a truthful account
of the daughter of Ukrainian immigrants coming to terms with the fact that her father and uncle may have
participated in the Holocaust (in the novel, the narrator's uncle was the subject of ongoing war crimes
investigations). Accusations of anti-Semitism and historical inaccuracy arose, but were rejected by the judges
of the literary prizes on the basis that this was a genuine attempt to understand the actions of those who took
part in the slaughter of Jews, all the more remarkable for the candor with which the author dealt with such
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dilemma faced by the Tribunal itself: whether the retrospective extension of
international criminal responsibility to perpetrators of crimes under the
applicable Charter9--a breach of strict legal positivism-was a greater or lesser
evil than allowing such perpetrators to go unpunished. Such questions were
commonly resolved by moral (and often tautologous), rather than strictly legal,
arguments: "[S]o far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if
his wrongs were allowed to go unpunished.""
Within the legal community it is widely accepted that although adherents
of the various schools of naturalism, relative positivism, pragmatism, and
utilitarianism found common ground in defending the legitimacy of the Charter,
most acknowledged its technical legal deficiencies. 39 That common ground was,
however, viewed from divergent perspectives. Whereas natural-law theorists
relied on metaphysical essences and transcendental beliefs, legal pragmatists
and utilitarianists had recourse to relativism, empiricism, and realism.4"
Ultimately, however, such issues were seen as irreducible to problems of legal
technicalities. Friedmann, for example, summarizes approaches to the Charter's
legality from transcendental ethics, intuitionist ethics, and various relativistic
approaches, concluding that "no legally compelling solution can be found for
this type of problem. Whatever the technical device, a subsequent and differing
personal issues. It was subsequently revealed that the author's name was in fact Helen Darville and that she
was of English extraction. The nom de plume Demidenko had been appropriated from fragmented reports
of the Babi Yar massacre in the Ukraine. The literary debate, which had concerned Australia's much-prided
multiculturalism, was quickly subsumed by the political question of what these events and the reaction to
them showed of Australia's isolation from history in general and the Holocaust in particular. See generally
ROBERT MANNE, THE CULTURE OF FORGmNG: HELEN DMIDENKO AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996).
37. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 2, art. 6; see also Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, art. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20
(amended Apr. 26, 1946), reprinted in BAssIoUNI, supra note 6, at 606.
38. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJORWAR CpMNALS, supra note 1, at 462. Moreover, in commenting on
the legal rationalizations in the Eichmann Case, Hannah Arendt noted that the court
never rose to the challenge of the unprecedented, not even in regard to the unprecedented nature
of the origins of the Israel state, which certainly was closest to its heart and thought. Instead,
it buried the proceedings under a flood of precedents-during the sessions of the first week of
the trial, to which the first fifty-three sections of the judgment correspond-many of which
sounded, at least to the layman's ear, like elaborate sophisms.
HANNAH ARENDT, EIcHmAN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALIrY OF EVIL 263 (1965).
39. For a legal positivist critique of the Nuremberg trials, see AUGUST VON KNIERM, THE
NuREmEPG TkitALS (1959); Whitney Harris, Book Review of The Nuremberg Trials by August von Knierem,
54 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1960); see also Otto Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14
DEPAUL L. REV. 333 (1965); Herbert Kraus, The Nuremberg Trial ofthe Major War Criminals: Reflections
After Seventeen Years, 13 DEPAUL L. REV. 233 (1964); Otto Pannenbecker, The Nuremberg War Crimes
Trial, 14 DEPAUL L. REv. 348 (1965); H.O. Pappe, On the Validity of Judicial Decisions in the Nazi Era,
23 MOD. L. REV. 260 (1960); Bert V.A. R6ling, The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 32, at 590. For other critical views, see generally NUREmBERo:
GERMAN VIEws OF WARTITiALS (Wilbourn E. Benton & Georg Grimm eds., 1955).
40. For a diverse range of views justifying the legitimacy of the Charter, see generally SHELDON
GLUECK, WAR CRINALs, THEIR PROSECTION AND PUNISHMENT (1944); JOsEPH B. KEENAN & BRENDAN
F. BROWN, CRIMEs AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAw (1950); SCHwARZENBERGER, supra note 8; ANN TUSA
& JOHN TUSA, THE Nuam BmaG TRIAL (1983); WoETzEL, supra note 28; Hans Kelsen, Collective and
Indivtdual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals,
31 CAL. L. REV. 530 (1943); H. Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 58 (1944); Georg Schwarzenberger, The Judgment at Nuremberg, 21 TUL. L. REV. 329
(1947); Quincy Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1948).
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set of values has to be substituted for the values governing the offensive
action. "4'
The vast majority of debate surrounding the validity of the trials thus
claimed moral, ethical, and equitable considerations rather than dealing
systematically with the legal issues arising under international law.42 Indeed, it
is argued that the attempt to do so is regressive:
mhe international moral order must be regarded as the cause, not the effect, of positive
law; ... such law does not derive its essence from physical power, and... any attempt to
isolate such law from morals is a symptom of juridical schizophrenia caused by the separation
of the brain of the lawyer from that of the human being.43
The splitting referred to here in such extreme language is the doctrinal
aftershock of the primitive international legal system's being forced to develop
by practice rather than theory. In many ways, contemporary debate over the
validity of "crimes against humanity" evinces a similar resistance to theoretical
interrogation: "We do not address those who are ideologically or politically
predisposed to the rejection of the idea [of an International Criminal Court]. We
wish to address the many legitimate questions raised in good faith by those who
support the idea .... "I From a strictly legal perspective, the two central
questions of the laws' being imposed ex post facto (with retroactive effect) and
directed unilaterally at the "captive enemies" are far from adequately
addressed.
The retroactivity of the law enforced by the Military Tribunals at
Nuremberg and Tokyo was justified essentially by unstated conceptions of
justice (presumably divined by reference to some "higher law") and the
removal of the Tribunal's power to consider the validity of those laws.4' One
of the crucial sites of contestation in the definition of crimes against humanity,
however, centers on this reliance on a universal morality to legitimize a legal
order restricted to particular historical circumstances. This was the case in
41. W. FRmDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 42(5th ed. 1967).
42. But see VON KNmREm, supra note 39 (providing legal positivist critique of Nuremberg Trials);
WO'zEL, supra note 28 (advocating development of international criminal court as response to constant
violations of classical international law by warring nations).
43. KEENAN & BROwN, supra note 40, chs. V-VI. Compare D'Amato's views on the subject:
Not only do positivists insist upon separating law from morality, but they also appear to be
unable to deal with moral questions raised by law once the two are separated. This inability
stems, I believe, from their simultaneous attempt to assert and to prove that law and morality
are separate; the argument reduces to a vicious circle.
Anthony D'Amato, The Moral Dilemma of Positivism, 20 VAL. UNiv. L. REv. 43, 43 (1985).
44. M. CherifBassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Needfor an International Criminal Court
in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151, 160 (1992).
45. Bassiouni identifies four basic answers to the contention that the retroactivity of the "principles
of legality" rendered them invalid: (1) a tautological argument that the Tribunal was bound by its own law
and could not inquire into its own validity or the validity of its law; (2) "Crimes against humanity" was an
extension of "war crimes" and as such did not violate the "principles of legality"; (3) the Charters were
declarative of international law; and (4) "Principles of legality" are non-binding principles of national
criminal justice. See BASSiOUNi, supra note 6, at 114-29.
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Nuremberg and Tokyo,4 6 and remains problematic in the constitution of the
more recent tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.47 Such problems
also arise in domestic prosecutions of alleged war criminals. The irony of an
Australian Federal Law's relying on the exercise of a global power to try
alleged war criminals for acts committed "in Europe in the period beginning on
1 September 1939 and ending on 8 August 1945 "48 was apparently lost on the
High Court of Australia when it upheld Australia's war crimes legislation in the
Polyukhovich case.49
Similarly, the significance of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals'
enforcement of "victor's justice" has never been adequately resolved. There
was never any question about the Allies' application of the same laws to their
own conduct, though this was raised by defense attorneys at Nuremberg" and
46. This was brought out in the Nuremberg trial in relation to acts prior to 1939 and the problematic
distinction between war crimes and "Crimes against Humanity." "[R]evolting and horrible as many of these
crimes were," they were not proved to have been committed in execution of, or in connection with, "war
crimes." As such, they were not Crimes against Humanity within the meaning of the Charter. See 22 TRIAL
OF THE MAjoR WAR CRuMINALS, supra note 1, at 498. In this context, Edward Morgan has observed the
curiosity of the Tribunal's distinction between crimes under the Charter that have no geographic location
and those that have taken place in Germany by reference to the date of their occurrence. See Edward
Morgan, Retributory Theater, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 42 (1988); see also BASSlOuNI, supra note
6, at 176-91.
47. The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 ("the
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia") was established by the Security Council "for the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the Security
Council upon the restoration of peace." S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. para. 2, U.N
Doc. S/Res/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993). The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States was established "for the sole purpose
of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December
1994." S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. para. 1, U.N. Doc. SIResl955 (1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1600 (1994).
48. See War Crimes Act, 1945, § 5 (Austi.) (as amended by the War Crimes Amendment Act, 1988
(AustI.)) (emphasis added).
49. See Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501. Mr. Polyukhovich was charged
in relation to the murder of Jews in the Ukraine. He was charged under Australia's amended war crimes
legislation, which extended its application to crimes committed by citizens of Axis powers against their
civilian population and allowed for trials in criminal rather than military courts. See id. The constitutionality
of this legislation was challenged, and it was upheld by Australia's High Court as a valid law under the
external affairs power. See AUSTL. CONST. § 51. Polyukhovich was subsequently committed for trial, but
the indictments were quashed for lack of evidence without going before a jury. See Gillian Triggs,
Australia's War Crimes Trials: All Pity Choked, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, supra note 2, at 123
(discussing Australia's "spasmodic, selective and short" history of prosecuting war crimes).
Contrast the selective exclusion of acts carried out by the French military in Algeria prior to French
adoption of the crimes against humanity provisions of the London Agreement. During the trial of Klaus
Barbie, charges against him were specifically narrowed to exclude such acts from the meaning of "crimes
against humanity." See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity in the Trial of Klaus
Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1335, 1337-39 (1989).
50. See BASSOumN, supra note 6, at 460-62 (discussing "tu quoque" defense). Bradley Smith has
also pointed out the dilemmas posed by the Allied effort to pass judgment on German behavior:
Surely much of Allied war crimes policy as well as large portions of the basic American plan
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has been the subject of limited domestic prosecution."' M. Cherif Bassiouni
refers to this as a "moral flaw" whose "lack of impartiality taints the
[International Military Tribunal] and Subsequent Proceedings under [Control
Council Law] 10, the Tokyo trials, and other post-Second World War trials
with the one-sidedness of victor's law."52 The politicization of these laws was
put most bluntly in the comment on the ex post facto debate by Justice Jackson:
"I think it is entirely proper that these four powers, in view of the disputed state
of the law of nations, should settle by agreement what the law is as the basis of
this proceeding. "I
This problem is said to be avoided in the International Tribunal established
to try suspected war criminals in the former Yugoslavia, which is described as
"the first truly international criminal tribunal. "I However, despite the fact that
neither the Yugoslavian Tribunal nor the Rwandan Tribunal represents either
victor or combatants per se-though from the outset the former was clearly
aimed at alleged Serbian war criminals 55-the issue of partiality remains
unaddressed in the choice of prosecuting these war criminals and not, for
example, pursuing Khmer Rouge leaders in Cambodia or the Iraqi military elite
appear to be mistakes plied on folly. The actions of the negotiators and the prosecutors are also
replete with blindness, miscalculation and a suicidal passion for complexity. Perhaps, more
basically, the whole notion of Allied action to bring justice to a war-tom world ran headlong
against the main thrust of the war itself.
BRADLEY SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NuRnMimoG 301 (1977).
51. See Simpson, supra note 2, at 5-6; see, e.g., United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973),
aff'd, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973). Lt. Calley was charged in relation to the infamous My Lai
massacre during the Vietnam war. The trial initially took place under martial law and was heard in federal
courts only on appeal.
52. BAsSIouNI, supra note 6, at 84; see also Karl Jaspers, The Significance of the Nurnberg Trials
for Germany and the World, 22 NoTRE DAME LAW. 150 (1946).
53. Report of Robert Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on
Military Trials 329 (1949) [hereinafter Jackson's Report]; cf Cavieehia, supra note 29, at 242-43
(suggesting inherently politicized war-crimes trials could damage reputation of International Criminal
Court).
54. See Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88
Am. J. INT'L L. 78, 78 (1994). The Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia was established by unanimous vote of
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. See S.C. Res. 827,
supra note 47. The Rwandan Tribunal was established with 13 in favor, 1 against (Rwanda) and 1 abstention
(China). See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 47. Rwanda voted against the resolution, expressing dissatisfaction
on the grounds that (i) the Tribunal's competence was limited; (ii) its composition and structure were
inappropriate and ineffective, and it "would only appease the conscience of the international community
rather than respond to the expectations of the Rwandese people"; (iii) it proposed to try not only genocide,
but also crimes that come under the jurisdiction of internal tribunals; (iv) certain countries that "took a very
active part in the civil war in Rwanda" were able to propose candidates for judges and participate in their
election; (v) some of the accused could be imprisoned outside Rwanda; (vi) capital punishment had been
ruled out, though it was provided for in the Rwanda penal code; (vii) the Tribunal should have sat in
Rwanda. See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 14-16, U.N. Doe. S/PV.3453 (1994) (remarks of Mr.
Bakuramutsa of Rwanda), cited in Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in
Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. &INT'LL. 11, 66 (1995).
55. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 47, pmbl. (referring specifically to "practice of 'ethnic
cleansing'"); cf Tribunal To Cite Bosnian Serb Odefas War Criminal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1995, at Al;
UN To Try Serbian War Crimes in Bosnia, THE AGE (Melbourne), Apr. 21, 1995, at 10; see also infra note
167.
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after the Gulf War.56 Indeed, it appears that the United Nations was more than
prepared to forgo bringing war criminals to "justice" in order to preserve hopes
of peace in the Balkans.'
A permanent International Criminal Court such as that proposed in the
International Law Commission's 1994 Draft Statutes would presumably remove
both these legal question marks (at least resituating the two jurisprudential
problems as jurisdictional and prosecutorial, respectively). It might even resolve
the problem of such tribunals dispensing justice as an extension of executive
power. Similarly, movement toward the adoption of a Code of Crimes would
strengthen the consistency that is crucial to the legitimacy of any international
criminal law rdgime.5 9
Much has been written on each of these topics. My concern here, however,
is with the nature of the order that such a r6gime might uphold-a topic that has
received far less critical attention and that goes to the heart of the atheoretical
pragmatism that has characterized the evolution of this body of law. To make
sense of the history of war crimes, then, it is necessary to examine the structure
within which such crimes operate: What values underpin this recourse to law?
And why is there such faith that law can defend these values? In the following
sections, I will approach this through a consideration of the functions that war-
crimes trials have traditionally served: as a performative act (as "theater") and
as an ordering principle.
56. See David A. Martin, Reluctance to Prosecute War Crimes: Of Causes and Cures, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 255 (1994); Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFt.,
Summer 1993, at 122; Simpson, supra note 2, at 7. On the issue of U.S. attempts to prosecute alleged Iraqi
war criminals, see Louis Rene Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes: Fulfilling the Expectations of International
Law After the Gulf War, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 425 (1992); Kenneth A. Williams, The Iraq-Kuwait Crisis:
An Analysis of the Unresolved Issue of War Crimes Liability, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 385 (1992); see also
Roberts, supra note 54, at 48-56. Gareth Evans has argued that
The creation of [an International Criminal Court] would certainly further underline the resolve
of the international community to respond to breaches of humanitarian law and gross violations
of human rights, and have an even stronger general deterrent effect-provided the commitment
of the international community to pursue perpetrators was firm and clear, which may not be
easily achievable in the short term.
GARETn EVANS, COOPERATING FOR PEACE: THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR THE 1990s AND BEYOND 43 (1993)
(emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., John Sweeney, UN Cover-up of Massacre, GUARDIAN VKLY. (London), Sept. 17,
1995, at 4 (discussing allegations of UN reluctance to report Serb brutality in fall of Srebenica).
58. See Report of the International Law Commission, Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994); see also Preparatory
Committee on International Criminal Court Concludes First Session, Press Release of Apr. 12, 1996, U.N.
Information Cen. Doc. L/2787 (1996) (discussing draft summary).
59. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where They
Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 375 (1992); Timothy L.H. McCormack &
Gerry J. Simpson, The International Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind: An Appraisal of the Substantive Provisions, 5 CRiM. L.F. 1 (1994).
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B. War Crimes as Theater °
The International Military Tribunal in Tokyo looked last week like a third-string road
company of the Nurnberg show.... Much care had gone into fitting the courtroom with
dark, walnut-toned paneling, imposing daises, convenient perches for the press and motion-
picture cameramen. The klieg lights suggested a Hollywood premiere.
Nurnberg's impresarios had used simpler furnishings, relied on the majesty of the concept
to set the tone. The German production had a touch of Wagner-elaborate vaunting of guilt,
protestations of heroic innocence. Tokyo's had the flavor of Gilbert & Sullivan.
-TIME, May 20, 1946.61
Many commentators have acknowledged the importance of war-crimes
trials as a public demonstration of justice.62 In this section and the one that
follows, however, I consider such trials as "theater" in two distinct ways: the
explicit performative function of the war-crimes trial as a feast for public
consumption (an aspect that has led to the denigration of some as "show
trials" 63), and the more subtle ways in which the invocation of justice
constitutes a particular conception of order in the public realm.' These themes
form the basis of the discussion of the crime of rape in Part III, in which the
gendered nature of this "order" is considered.
The desire to present justice as a fait accompli for the viewers at home
perhaps reached its most superficial and racist in the Tokyo trials,6' but it was
60. Note that the use of the word "theater" refers to the public display of the war-crimes trial and
its sometimes cathartic function. It is in no way intended to trivialize the subject matter.
61. War Crimes, TIME, May 20, 1946, at 24.62. See, e.g., APENDT, supra note 38, at 10; c REd GM, VIoLENCE AND T RE SACRED (Patrick
Gregory trans., 1972) (discussing more general theory of function of criminal law); Binder, supra note 49.
63. Perhaps the most spectacular example of such a trial is the Demjanjuk affair. John Demjanjuk
was suspected to be Ivan the Terrible, the operator of the gas chambers in the Extermination Camp at
Treblinka. He was extradited from the United States to Israel and, despite questionable identification
evidence, was convicted in the District Court of Jerusalem under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Law, 57 SEFER HACHUIuM 281 (1950). In the course of the appeal, documents were produced
that established that another man, Ivan Marchenko, was in fact the man described in the indictment.
Demjanjuk was acquitted. See Cr.A. 347/88, Demjanjuk v. The State of Israel, P.D. 447 (July 29, 1993).
His defense attorney wrote a book on the experience. YoRAm SHErE, DEFENDING "IvAN THE TERRIBLE":
THE CONSPIRACY To CoNVICT JOHN DEtIAmnUK (Haim Watzman trans., 1996).
64. Cf. R.B. PAL, INTERNATIONALMnzrrARYTRmUNALFORTHEFAREAST: DISSENTrNTJDGMEtT
OF JUSTICE PAL 697-701 (1953) (expressing concern that Tribunal's emphasis on retribution and revenge
against individual leaders detracts from higher purpose of Tribunal which is to serve justice and promote
peace).
65. In comparison to the volumes written about the Nuremberg trials that followed the end of the
Second World War, little has been written about the proceedings of the other International Military Tribunal
established in Tokyo. Whereas the complete Nuremberg judgment was published in 1947 in both English
and French, the full judgment of the Tribunal for the Far East remained available only in mimeographed
form until 1977. Much of what has been written since the trial is highly critical of the "victor's justice" that
was seen to have characterized the proceedings, with suggestions that the trial was a means of extracting
revenge for the bombing of Pearl Harbor or expiating guilt for the use of atomic weapons in Japan. See
generally RiCHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JusTIcE: THE TOKYO WAR CRMEs TRIAL (1971); PHILIP R.
PICCIGAL.O, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIUMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945-1951 (1987);
PAUL W. SCHmOEDER, THE AxIs AutANCE AND JAPAN.sE-AdBicAN RELATIONS 228 (1958); THE TOKYO
WAR CRIME TRIAL: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM (C. Hosoya et al. eds., 1986). If Nuremberg provides
the moral and legal foundations for the modern prosecution of war crimes, Tokyo remains a shadowy
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in the European reaction to the horrors of Nazism that the conflicting tensions
of justice and politics were most manifest:
The purpose was not to punish all cases of criminal guilt, but to give expression to the
abhorrence of what had happened. The exemplary punishments served the purpose of
restoring the legal order, that is of reassuring the whole community that what they had
witnessed for so many years was criminal behaviour."
This assertion of a "reassurance" role for war-crimes trials suggests that
beyond the simple assertion of victor's justice discussed above,67 it is possible
to recognize additional functions that the trials served at the conclusion of
hostilities.'s Some are clearly articulated; others are implicit in the rhetoric
surrounding the trials and their political ends. In this section I will discuss three
such functions: retribution for the sins committed by the defeated enemy,
deterrence of future evils, and the exposition of moral and political outrage that
is seen as a necessary cathartic stage in the return to order.69
1. Retribution
The retributory theme was evident most clearly in the Allies' early
preparations for the Nuremberg trials. In 1942, the U.S. representative to the
International Conference on Military Trials reported that the Allies had
reaffirmed "their solemn resolution to insure that those responsible for these
crimes shall not escape retribution."7' By 1943, Stalin and Roosevelt had
publicly affirmed their commitment to punishing the "criminals"7 for their
"acts of savagery."' But the conclusion of the Moscow Declaration of
November 1, 1943 captured the Allies' ambivalence about the relative worth of
a juridical or a purely military resolution: "Most assuredly the three Allied
Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver
reminder of its limitations.
66. Bert V.A. R6ling, Aspects of Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War, in 1
THE NEw HUMANITARIAN LAw oF ARMED CoNFLIcr 199, 206 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979) (emphasis
added).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
68. The importance of the fact that Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia commenced work while the
conflict continued is discussed infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
69. In this section I am primarily concerned with the notion of order as the exposition of a moral
reaction against disorder. In Section H.B, I turn to the more explicitly politicized notions of order validated
by the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text. Bridging the two
is the cathartic experience that war crimes may engender, at once performative and constitutive. See infra
notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
70. Tamara L. Tompkins, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime: Speaking the Unspeakable, 70 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 845, 884 (1995).
71. See Joseph Stalin, Russia's War Achievements: The Task of Restoration and Organization
Ahead, Speech Before Meeting of Moscow Workers, in 10 VITAL SPEECHS op THE DAY 105, 108 (1943)
(delivered on eve of twenty-sixth anniversary of 1917 revolution), quoted in Tompkins, supra note 70, at
884.
72. Roosevelt declared it "fitting that we should again proclaim our determination that none who
participate in these acts of savagery shall go unpunished." Jackson's Report, supra note 53, at 10.
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them to their accusers in order that justice may be done."73 Even in the closing
moments of the war, it was far from clear that the Allies would pursue legal
avenues to punish the Nazi leadership. The British, for example, favored the
summary execution of a dozen or so leading members of the Nazi apparatus.74
Such an approach enjoyed the virtues of simplicity and candor, sparing the
Allies the tedious process of organizing the mechanisms and material necessary
to present a watertight case, and precluding the legal rationalizations and
dilatory tactics that the guilty might employ to delay their judgment. In
addition, the victors would not be required to "disguise a punishment exacted
by one sovereign upon another by appeal to the neutral instrument of the law. "I
The final decision to cede "Power ... to Reason"76 was formalized on a
particularly inauspicious date. As has been noted above, the Allies signed the
London Agreement, the foundation of the Nuremberg trials and the basis for
modem international humanitarian law, on August 8, 1945-the same day that
the United States dropped the atomic bomb that destroyed Nagasaki.77
Retribution will presumably be a more important issue when it is the
prosecuting power that has (at least in part) suffered the alleged wrongs.' This
can be seen in the argument of Justice Jackson at Nuremberg that "[e]ither the
victors must judge the vanquished or we must leave the defeated to judge
themselves," 79 and in the statement of the French judge Donnedieu de Vabres
that the Allies "who had risked everything could not admit neutrals" to the
bench.80 As such, retribution is a less important factor in the prosecutions
73. See Tompkins, supra note 70, at 884.
74. The proposal apparently enjoyed Soviet support-indeed, Stalin, in a "semi-jocular" recom-
mendation, suggested that 50,000 German general staff officers be shot. See TAYLOR, supra note 16, at
29-30; Istvdn Deadk, Misjudgment at Nuremberg, N.Y. REv. BoOKS, Oct. 7, 1993, at 46, 48; Steven
Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfilfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 833, 836-45 (1990).
75. Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness: Screening Nazi Concentration Camps Before the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, 105 YALE L.J. 449, 457 (1995). In the case of the Israeli prosecution of Adolf Eichmann,
the difficulties in extraditing him from Argentina led to "frequent" mention of the alternative of "kill[ingl
him right then and there, in the streets of Buenos Aires." ARENDT, supra note 38, at 265. Arendt notes a
successful instance of such instant justice in 1921, when the Armenian Tehlirian, in the middle of Berlin,
shot dead Talaat Bey, one of the major participants in the Armenian pogroms of 1915. Id.; see supra text
accompanying note 23.
76. See JACKSON, supra note 5.
77. See supra note 2; see also B.V.A. RfuiNG, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND 110-16 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1993). On the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, see generally NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
LAW 19-50 (Arthur Selwyn Miller & Martin Feinrider eds., 1984).
78. This significance can be seen, for example, in arguments made during the prosecution of Adolf
Eichmann:
When I stand before you, judges of Israel, in this court, to accuse Adolf Eichmann, I do not
stand alone. Here with me at this moment stand six million prosecutors. But alas, they cannot
rise to level the finger of accusation in the direction of the glass dock and cry out J'accuse
against the man who sits there.... Their blood cries to Heaven, but their voice cannot be
heard. Thus it falls to me to be their mouthpiece and to deliver the heinous accusation in their
name.
ARENDT, supra note 38, at 260 (quoting Gideon Hausner's opening address for prosecution). Arendt
identifies the failure of the Jerusalem court to admit witnesses for the defense as the most serious aspect of
the victor's justice that marred the conviction of Eichmann. See id. at 274.
79. ARENDT, supra note 38, at 274 (quoting Jackson).
80. Id. (quoting Vabres).
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concerning the former Yugoslavia, except perhaps insofar as it relates to the
violation of a certain "new" notion of order that was seen to follow the collapse
of the USSR"' and to public outrage at the atrocities covered prominently by the
media.Y2
2. Deterrence
The desire that the Nuremberg trials serve a deterrent function was a
corollary of the view that the Second World War might have been prevented if
the initiators of the First World War had been justly punished. 3 Similarly, the
Tokyo trials and other war crimes tribunals that allocated individual
responsibility were justified on the basis of their capacity to punish individual
actors and, presumably, to deter other individuals from performing such acts
in the future.'
The applicability of international law to individuals came to constitute the
first of the "Nuremberg Principles" adopted by the UN General Assembly in
1950.1 Over the course of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, this principle was
81. Perhaps the definitive example of the rhetoric accompanying the (brave) new world order that
was intended to follow the decline of the USSR comes from the then President of the United States, George
Bush: "[T]he ideals that have spawned new freedoms throughout the world have received their boldest and
clearest expression in our great country the United States. Never before has the world looked more to the
American example. Never before have so many millions drawn hope from the American idea." George
Bush, The Possibility of a New World Order, Speech at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama
(Apr. 13, 1991), in 57 VrrAL SPECHES OF THE DAY 450, 452 (1991); see also Francis Fukuyamna, The End
ofHistory? The National Interest, Sept. 1989, at 3, 4 (article by deputy director of U.S. State Department's
policy planning staff on coming of age of world of Western liberal values); William Gianaris, The New
World Order and the Need for an International Criminal Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88 (1992)
(discussing need for punishment of international criminals). Fukayama's argument has since been expanded
into a book. FRANCIs FuUYAMA, THE END oF HIsTORY AND THE LAsT MAN (1992). For a critical
discussion of the assertion that "we won the Cold War," see NoAM CHOMsKY, YEAR 501: THE CONQUEST
CoNTiNUES 61-64 (1993).
82. See, e.g., James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 639-41 (1993).
83. See supra notes 29-35 (discussing Leipzig trials); see also David Matas, Prosecuting Crimes
Against Humanity: The Lessons of World War1, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 86, 86 (1989) ("[Unless crimes
against humanity are vigorously prosecuted they are destined to be repeated.").
84. See, e.g., Egon Schwelb, CrimesAgainst Humanity, 23 BlaT. Y.B. INT'LL. 178, 198-99 (1947)
(quoting closing arguments of Sir Hartley Shawcross, British Chief Prosecutor). Shawcross stated:
The Charter of [the Nuremberg] Tribunal embodies a beneficent principle-much more limited
than some would like it to be-and it gives warning for the future-I say, and repeat again,
gives warning for the future, to dictators and tyrants masquerading as a State that if, in order
to strengthen or further their crimes against the community of nations they debase the sanctity
of man in their own countries, they act at their peril, for they affront the International Law of
mankind.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Brenton Saunders, Comment, The World's Forgotten Lesson: The Punishment
of War Criminals in the Former Yugoslavia, 8 TEMP. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 357, 374-75 (1994) (arguing that
lack of prosecution of war crimes since World War II has led to inadequate deterrence, sending message
"that war crimes will go unpunished."). But see JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRiBUNALS AND
INTERNATIONAL CRImS 10 (Greenwood Press 1971) (1954) (supporting punishment for war crimes as
matter of justice, but "strongly suspect[ing] that international penal justice [for war crimes] may fail" as
deterrent).
85. See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
in the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950),
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variously justified by reference to the precedent established by piracy as an
international crime; 6 to international duties that "transcend the national
obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state";' and to the
consequences of allowing individuals to hide behind the veil of sovereignty:
This principle of personal liability is a necessary as well as logical one if International Law
is to render real help to the maintenance of peace. An International Law which operates only
on states can be enforced only by war because the most practicable method of coercing a state
is warfare .... Only sanctions which reach individuals can peacefully and effectively be
enforced.'
More recently, the need to attribute liability to persons responsible for acts that
have offended international norms has been invoked once again.89 Theodor
Meron has observed that the mere threat of war-crimes trials in past wars (as
in the case of the Persian Gulf War) has proven to be an ineffective deterrent,
and that the trials in the former Yugoslavia have provided a unique opportunity
to use war-crimes trials as part of the resolution of a dispute.' This view- is
consistent with the linkage made in eventual peace negotiations between
political participation and cooperation with the International Tribunal under the
Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement.9' Whether such trials will in fact engender the
desired response in potential war criminals in other trouble spots remains, of
course, to be seen.
Of crucial importance here is the failure to prosecute the most prominent
alleged war criminals. The Dayton Agreement, which was remarkable for the
reprinted in 44 AM. J. INT'L L. (OFIciAL DocuMENTS SuPPLMENT) 126. Principle I reads: "Any person
who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to
punishment." Id.; see also United Nations, The Charter and Judgment of the Nlrnberg Tribunal: History
andAnalysis (1949) (preparatory memorandum by the Secretary General to assist work of International Law
Commission).
86. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 88. The analogy with piracy is questionable at the least. See, e.g.,
A.R. Carnegie, Jurisdiction over Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, 39 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 402,
421 (1963).
87. 22 TPRAL OF TM MAJOR WAR CRnmINAMS, supra note 1, at 466 ("[The very essence of the
Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience
imposed by the individual state.").
88. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 88; cf 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJoR WAR CRIMiALS, supra note 1, at
466 ("Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.").
89. The Security Council Resolution calling for the establishment of a tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia indirectly relied upon the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, to justify the statement that
"persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually
responsible in respect of such breaches" (to whom such persons are generally responsible was left unstated).
See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, paras.
37-40, U.N. Doe. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1168 [hereinafterReport of the Secretary General].
Earlier resolutions also enunciated this proposition. See, e.g. S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3093rd rtg., para. 10, U.N. Doe. SIRes/64 (1992); S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47thSess., 3106th mtg.,
para. 1, U.N. Doe. S/Res/771 (1992).
90. See Meron, supra note 56, at 122-23.
91. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina-Republic of Croatia-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Doe. A/50/790-
S/1995/999 (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 89 [hereinafter General Framework Agreement]; see Paul Szasz,
The Protection of Human Rights Through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J. INT'L
L. 301, 313-14.
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lack of any "amnesty-for-peace" clause, has been compromised by the failure
to bring former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko
Mladic before the Tribunal. Incoming Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour has
recently warned that unless the Tribunal is given assistance in bringing indicted
war criminals to trial, "its perceived failure may exacerbate the tensions that it
was designed to appease."'
At the time of writing, over seventy individuals had been indicted with war
crimes. Only seven were in custody at the Hague.'
3. Catharsis
It is the desire for the war-crimes trial to allow the international community
to purge itself through catharsis, however, that underlies the preceding two
functions. The motivation for these most recent trials cannot be understood
outside the history of European approaches to war crimes. 4 Both the failures
of Leipzig and the horrors of Auschwitz informed the Allies' resolve to form
the Nuremberg Tribunal. Fifty years ago, Justice Jackson, one of the main
advocates for a juridical rather than an exclusively military settlement of Nazi
atrocities, 9 stated in his opening address to the Tribunal: "The wrongs which
we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and so
devastating, that civilisation cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it
cannot survive their being repeated."96 As Richard Goldstone, the South
African judge and former Chief Prosecutor at the Hague tribunals for both
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, recently commented, however, "[t]he hope of 'never
again' became the reality of again and again. "I
More than any other conflict, events in the former Yugoslavia offended this
collective memory. The doubly sanitized term, "ethnic cleansing,"98 did little
to muffle the resonance of these events with the pogroms of the Second World
War'-not least because this carnage was taking place in Europe. 10 When
92. Ed Vulliamy, Hague's New Top Prosecutor Demands Help for Tribunal, GUARDIAN
(Manchester), Oct. 4, 1996, at 14; see also Robert Fisk, Bosnia Judge Condemns West, INDEPENDENT
(London), Sept. 17, 1996, at 1 (reporting Judge Richard Goldstone's belief that failure would undermine
international justice).
93. See Ian Geoghegan, New Bosnia War Crimes Chief Calls for More Arrests, REUTERS, Sept. 30,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuters World Service File.
94. Cf. Payam Akhavam, Punishing War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: A Critical Juncture for
the New World Order, 15 HUM. RTs. Q. 262, 264 (1993) (arguing that atrocities in the Balkans put into
question "the most fundamental norms of civilized human behavior which have been painstakingly won and
reaffirmed since the Second World War").
95. See Douglas, supra note 75, at 459-63.
96. TRIALOF THE MAjoR WAR CRNmAIS, supra note 1, at 49.
97. Were They Just Obeying Orders?, GUADIAN (Manchester), May 7, 1996, at 10.
98. See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), Annex 1, paras. 55-56, U.N. Doc S/25274 (1993) ("The expression 'ethnic
cleansing' is relatively new. Considered in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 'ethnic
cleansing' means rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove
persons of given groups from the area. 'Ethnic cleansing' is contrary to international law.").
99. Cf Paul Parin, Open Wounds: Ethnopsychoanalytic Reflections on the Wars in the Former
Yugoslavia, in MAss RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BosNIA-HERzEGovINA 35, 37-40 (Alexandra
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photographs of concentration camps reminiscent of the Holocaust emerged,
accompanied by harrowing accounts of massacres, torture, and rape,
embarrassment and, perhaps, guilt, eventually forced the international
community into action.10 And, once again, this action was compromised by the
desire to pursue objectives at once judicial, military, and political.'"2
It is this third function of the war-crimes trial-as heralding a return to
order, or perhaps as constitutive of an order-that will be pursued in depth in
the next section.
C. War, Crime, and Order
The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; and that is precisely what
constitutes their monstrousness. For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough. It may
well be essential to hang Goering, but it is totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast
to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems. That is the reason why
the Nazis in Nuremberg are so smug .... We are simply not equipped to deal, on a human
political level, with a guilt that is beyond crime.
-Hannah Arendt' 03
In the lead-up to the Nuremberg trials, conflicts emerged among the Allies
as to the relative importance of prosecuting the two broad species of crimes
articulated in the London Charter."° The United States (through Justice
Stigimayer ed., 1994) [hereinafter MAss RAPE] (discussing hatred between Serbs and Croats as being
"ignited by an especially repellent 'unresolved past'-atrocities committed under the Ustasha State in
particular live on in the memory of survivors but were "never elucidated and put in order.").
100. The comparative importance accorded to the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
is also indicative of this Eurocentric bias. See Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes
Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 243, 245 (1994).
101. See id. James Crawford, Chair of the ILC Working Group for an International Criminal Court,
has argued that these more recent moves towards an international criminal regime are the product of three
crucial factors:
the large-scale breakdown of state order in particular societies leading to massive violations of
human rights, support for action in the Security Council, associated with an unwillingess by
any permanent member to veto that action, and the intensive and detailed media coverage of the
atrocities, giving rise to public demand that "something" be done.
James Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 404,
407 (1995); see also infra note 168.
102. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
103. HANNAH ARENDT, KARL JASPER'S CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969, at 54 (Lotte Kohler & Hans
Saner eds., 1992) (footnote omitted); cf. infra notes 138-42.
104. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 2, art. 6:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances,
or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing;
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
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Jackson, its Chief of Counsel) wanted the crime of aggression to serve as the
focus of the Allies' case. It argued that belligerent militarism remained the
greatest threat and could be understood as the proximate cause of the Nazis'
other crimes." 5 The French resisted the inclusion of crimes against peace,
however, arguing that war crimes and crimes against humanity should be
paramount."' 6 These divergent approaches can be seen, in part, as relating to the
perceived foundations of international law that were said to underpin the
Tribunal," ° but also as signifying distinct ways of attempting to comprehend in
legal form the events that Arendt characterized as "explod[ing] the limits of the
law. "108
Ultimately, it was those who had been found guilty of "those quite
uncommon atrocities that actually constituted a 'crime against humanity' or, as
the French prosecutor Frangois de Menthon called it, with greater accuracy, a
'crime against the human status ' "1"o who received the greatest penalties. Death
sentences were handed down at Nuremberg not for crimes against peace, but
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or both."' At the same time, the
notion that aggression was "the supreme international crime" was silently
abandoned."' Just as the Tribunal shaped the future of international criminal
law, so this distinction accurately foreshadowed the future treatment of the
putative crime of aggression. Whereas Jackson hoped that this crime would
emerge as the great legacy of the Nuremberg trials,"' the formation of the
United Nations and its subsequent domination by the politics of the Cold War
saw that function assumed by the Security Council."'
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation
of the domestic law of the count where perpetrated.
Id.; see also Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, supra note 37, art. 5.
105. See TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 76-77.
106. See id. at 65-67.
107. See Douglas, supra note 75, at 460 ("[l]ntemational law nd custom seemed less ambiguous in
their condemnation of extermination than in their rejection of aggressive militarism . .
108. ARENDT, supra note 103, at 54.
109. ARENDT, supra note 38, at 257.
110. Twenty-four Nazi leaders each were ultimately indicted on two or more counts. Charges were
dropped against Gustav Krupp, who was deemed too ill to be tried, and Robert Ley, who committed suicide.
The Tribunal handed down twelve death sentences, seven prison terms (three for life, two for twenty years,
one for fifteen years, and one for ten years), and three acquittals. All those sentenced to hang were found
guilty of crimes against humanity and in most cases of other crimes also. See Quincy Wright, The Law of
the Nuremberg Trial, in INTERNAnTONAL CmnaNAL LAw, supra note 27, at 239, 242-43.
111. See ANrrT, supra note 38, at 257; see also TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 635-38. On the
approach to aggression taken in the Tokyo trials, see R61ing, supra note 66, at 208-19.
112. For Jackson's view on the initiation of aggressive war, see TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 635.
113. See Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir of the Nuremberg
Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 281, 291 (1994) ("Nuremberg did establish a rule of law concerning
aggressive war; it is codified in the United Nations Charter . . . . However, this rule of law is not
justiciable .... Great power politics is now dressed up in the rhetoric of the rule of law and sanctified by
the U.N. Charter."); cf O'Brien, supra note 82, at 645 ("Crimes against peace are appropriately omitted
from the Yugoslav statute. Their inclusion would almost inevitably require the tribunal to investigate the
causes of the conflict itself ... which would involve the tribunal squarely in the political issues surrounding
the conflict."). See generally Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 271
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Despite the decreased emphasis on crimes against peace, however, war-
crimes trials have continued to serve a legitimating role that is intimately linked
to particular conceptions of order. This notion of order is closely related to the
military projects that have provided their political context." 4 This is fairly clear
with regard to what I have earlier called the first and second functions of war-
crimes trials: retribution and deterrence. In different ways, these aims reflect
military objectives pursued by legal means, explicitly linked to the maintenance
of order. But it is in relation to my third category that this order itself is called
into question.
In some obvious situations, then, the war-crimes trial serves as the
validation of a peace achieved through military means, with the invocation of
law marking the ascendancy of reason over power. Nuremberg is, of course,
the paradigmatic example, and the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia may be
another. But it is also clear that war-crimes trials, beyond their role in the
conclusion of hostilities, validate the order by reference to that which defines
it: the State, the nation, and the citizen-subject. I will consider these two ends
in turn.
1. Law and Order
The desire for the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to validate, in some
way, the post-Cold War international order is reflected in the preambles to the
Security Council Resolutions that established it. The expressions of "grave
alarm," 115 and the faith in the utility of war-crimes trials in "ensuring that such
violations are halted and effectively redressed,"" 6 suggest a belief in the ability
of such trials to draw a line between the Hobbesian state of war and a post-
Grotian peace under law."7 Of particular importance in this context is the legal
foundation on which the Tribunal rests."' The Tribunal's authority emerges
from a determination by the UN Security Council that breaches of humanitarian
law in the former Yugoslavia constitute a "threat to international peace and
security" within the meaning of Chapter VII of the UN Charter." 9 We have,
(1985) (discussing historical origins of UN Charter provision against threats or uses of force); Romana
Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (1988) (analyzing status of "threats of force" under
international law and discussing Security Council's role with respect to threats of force).
114. Kenneth Anderson argues that the pursuit of symbolic justice may undermine the task of
achieving "substantive justice," which
can come for the millions of people affected by ethnic cleansing only by massive outside
intervention-war, in other words, and making sure that the just side wins .... Nuremberg
was a lovely hood ornament on the ungainly vehicle that freed Europe from the Nazis; it was
not, however, a substitute for D-Day.
Kenneth Anderson, Illiberal Tolerance: An Essay on the Fall of Yugoslavia and the Rise of Multiculturalism
in the United States, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 385, 405 n.56 (1993).
115. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 47, pmbl., 32 I.L.M. at 1203.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 14; cf DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCrJEES 283 (1987).
118. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
119. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 47, pmbl., 32 I.L.M. at 1204; cf. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 47,
pmbl., 32 I.L.M. at 1600 (using similar language when establishing Rwandan war crimes tribunal).
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then, the equation of law and order, through the legitimation of law as order.
In Nuremberg and Tokyo, this law was clearly backed up by military
strength-it was reason that stayed the hand of vengeance." Indeed, it has been
argued that it is not possible to have a juridical resolution that is not premised
on such "victor's justice":
['rio reduce the world to a courtroom, to legal memoranda and pleadings and paperwork, is
possible only once an army sits atop its vanquished enemy .... The Yugoslavia tribunal
invokes the law as a rhetorical device to make the UN appear to do more than it has, but
everyone knows that those who would conduct the trial have not paid the price ....
The Yugoslavia Tribunal seeks to make history; but the true lesson of Nuremberg is
that the power of law to reduce history to its terms can only be accomplished where
history-victory and surrender-has been made elsewhere.'
The failure to apprehend the most prominent of the alleged war criminals
and the speed with which elections were held in war-ravaged Bosnia under the
Dayton Accord" seem to support the theory that the primary objective of the
United Nations is to promote the appearance of order."2 Regardless of such
allegations-which at times verge on accusations of malafides-the more subtle
and interesting question is the nature of the order that is conceived as being the
goal of these operations.
As the United Nations struggles to establish Bosnia as a viable and
democratic state, with effective partition keeping the warring factions at bay,
it is not insignificant that primary responsibility has been taken by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a predominantly
military organization.124 Although various methods have been adopted by the
References to peace and security recur frequently:
[Establishing the International Tribunal by Security Council Resolution rather than by treaty and
without the involvement of the General Assembly] would constitute a measure to maintain or
restore international peace and security, following the requisite determination of the existence
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
Report ofthe Secretary General, 32 I.L.M. at 1168 (emphasis added); see also id. para. 26, 32 I.L.M. at
1169 ("[Ihe establishment of an international tribunal would bring about the achievement of the aim of
putting an end to such crimes and of taking effective measures to bring to justice the persons responsible
for them, and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.").
120. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
121. See Anderson, supra note 113, at 1076. Telford Taylor has also warned against exclusive
reliance on legal mechanisms to achieve political ends:
[l]n terms of enforcement, whether the charge is war crimes or crimes against humanity, I think
it is a mistake to expect that the device of a criminal trial is the major way in which the
enforcement of those limitations and obligations is going to be achieved .... []he idea that
trials alone (or statutes and treaties) can bring about the reforms and remedies that we hope for
is misplaced reliance.
Telford Taylor, Forty Years After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The Impact of the War Crimes Trials
on International and National Law, 80 AM. Soc'Y INL L. 56, 70 (1986).
122. See Geoghegan, supra note 93.
123. During the early years of the crisis, this was reflected most clearly in U.S. foreign policy. The
Bush administration in fact issued a directive that the conflict was to be presented as an impenetrable civil
war in which no intercession was possible. See George Kenney, See No Evil, Make No Policy, WAsti.
MoNTHLY, Nov. 1, 1992, at 33.
124. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg., para. 6, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1031 (1995); see also Szasz, supra note 91, at 304-05 (noting poorly defined legal roles 9f states);
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international community (economic sanctions, military intervention, political
maneuvering), there has been a continual tension between the desire to achieve
a swift and "clean" resolution to the conflict and the understanding that a long-
term resolution demands some form of reconciliation within the putative
Bosnian state.' 2
It is the former impulse that has long dominated international politics and
which, in Part III, I identify with what may be termed a masculinist world
view. In such a world view, the cathartic experience of the war-crimes trial acts
to legitimate an order achieved through military force. Such an approach to
justice is premised on the legitimation of violence in two ways. First, it
explicitly validates certain acts of violence as lawful and acceptable. Second,
it binds the dominant conception of order (equated with "peace") to the
continual possibility of and respect for violence."S
Such an approach-dominated by force, instrumental power, and the
perpetual opposition of unitary actors-may be characterized as a masculinist
conception of international "order."'" In many ways, it mimics the dichotomy
made in domestic law between public and private order." Feminist legal
theorists have exposed the role of this conception in institutionalizing patriarchal
power structures within the state, 29 but the implications of privileging such a
notion of order at the international level have received comparatively little
cf S.C. Res. 1022, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3595th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/Res/1022 (1995) (noting
responsibility of other states).
125. The initial European response to the war in Slovenia and Croatia in the summer of 1991
followed historical alliances, with France and Great Britain aligning with Serbia, Germany and Austria with
Croatia. When the United Nations began discussing military intervention in April 1993, these alliances,
together with reservations about the new Germany, ensured European inaction. See Alexandra Stiglmayer,
The War in the Former Yugoslavia, in MASS RAPE, supra note 99, at 1, 22.
126. See KENNEDY, supra note 117, at 281-86.
127. See generally CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS BEAcHEs & BASES: MAKNG FEMINIST SENSE OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1989) (arguing that masculinst conception leads to faulty understanding of how
international political system actually works); CYNTIHIA ENLOE, THE MORNING AFER: SEXUAL POLmcs AT
Tm END OF THE COLD WAR (1993) (arguing that women's situation after sacrifice in war does not change)
[hereinafter ENLOE, THE MORNING AFrER]; GENDERED STATES: FEMISr (RE)VISIoNS OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY (V. Spike Peterson ed., 1992) (discussing feminist approaches to international order)
[hereinafter GENDERED STATES]; Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in
International Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PRons. 293 (1993) (applying feminist legal theory to
international law); Anne Sisson Runyan & V. Spike Peterson, The Radical Future of Realism: Feminist
Subversions ofJR Theory, 16 ALTERNATIES 67 (1991) (reviewing contemporary feminist critiques of the
state, interstate system, and preeminent and patriarchal ideology of realism that constructs and reflects
modem international relations); Christine Sylvester, The Emperors' Theories and Transformations: Looking
at the Field Through Feminist Lenses, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE GLOBAL PoITICAL ECONOMY 230
(Dennis C. Pirages & Christine Sylvester eds., 1990) (juxtaposing mainstream theories of international
relations and political economy with feminist critiques).
128. See Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L.
613, 625-29, 644 (1991) (concluding that dichotomy between male and female is not as strict in
international law as it is in domestic sphere and that coupling this with differing process and aims of
international law may render it more open to feminist analysis than other areas of law).
129. A prime example of this is the institutionalization of militarism. See generally CYNTmA ENLOE,
DOES KHIm BECOME You? THE MiLiTAlRSATION OF WOMEN'S Lim (1983) (discussing multiple roles of
women interacting with military).
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attention. 3 ' This is the first of the two themes that link this interrogation of
order in Part II with the analysis of rape as a war crime in Part III of this
Article.
2. Ordering the Subject
In addition to the utility of war crimes in validating an "order," however,
they may also be used to constitute the subjects that define that order. Where
Nuremberg provides the paradigm of the former project (with Tokyo as a
warning as to its inherent dangers'), the latter is most clearly seen in the
domestic prosecutions of war crimes. 13 2
The cathartic effect of the war-crimes trial is therefore not limited to a
unique moment of redemption; such a cultural moment may serve as a
"pedagogical event"' with an ongoing historical and moral function. In this
way the war crimes trial acts as an event that transmutes the "historical
past.., into a judicial present." 154 Far more than an act of closure in the dark
chapter of a nation's history, the war-crimes trial may in fact be definitive of the
public morality that it legitimates.' Here, Arendt's description of the guilt
"beyond crime" at Nuremberg'36 makes a stark contrast with her account of the
trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem fifteen years later. 37 It was precisely
Eichmann's humanness, his banality' that undermined all attempts to turn his
trial into an exorcism of the Jewish State. 139
130. See R.B.J. Walker, Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations, in GENDERED
STATES, supra note 127, at 179, 179-202 (reporting that "feminist voices have begun to make themselves
heard" and highlighting questions for discussion).
131. See MiNEAR, supra note 65.
132. See GIRARD, supra note 62; Binder, supra note 49, at 1371.
133. See Alice Kaplan, Introduction to ALAIN Fn, iELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN: THE KLAUS
BARnm TRLIAL AND CIMES AGAINST HUMANITY at ix, xvi (1992).
134. FINxiELKRAUT, supra note 133, at 2.
135. This is reflected in the use that is made of time. War crimes at once claim a universal jurisdic-
tion but are restricted to the historical specificity of the moment-in this way, their prosecution attempts to
confine the moment in its historical abnormality while simultaneously making its lesson universal and
timeless. See Simpson, supra note 2, at 8.
136. See ARENDT, supra note 103, at 54.
137. Cr.C. (Jm.) 40/61, The Attorney General v. Eichmann, 45 P.M. 3 (1965), reprinted in 36
I.L.R. 5, 18 (1968); aff'd on other grounds, Cr.A. 336161, Eichmann v. The Attorney General, 16 P.D.
2033 (1962), reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 5, 277 (1968).
138. See ARENDT, supra note 38, at 276 ("The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so
many were like him, and that the many were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal."). Another
commentator has noted:
This is why it is not so much the natural innocence of creatures that Kafka and Walser allow
to prevail against divine omnipotence as the natural innocence of being tempted. Their demon
is not a tempter but a being infinitely susceptible to temptation. Eichmann, an absolutely banal
man who was tempted to evil precisely by the powers of right and law, is the terrible
confirmation through which our era has revenged itself on their diagnosis.
GioRio AGAMBEN, THE COMING COMMUNITY 32 (1993).
139. See ARENDT, supra note 38, at 260. Leonard Cohen captured this in his poem, "All There Is
To Know About Adolf Eichmann":
Number of Fingers: Ten.
Number of Toes: Ten.
Intelligence: Medium.
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Edward Morgan has broadened this analysis of war-crimes trials (as
"theater") to suggest that the symbolic purpose of the punishment of the war
criminal lies in the "ritualized retelling of the tribulations of history."140 The
rehearsal of these horror stories serves not only to educate ourselves about our
history and the extremes of human nature, but also to "dramatize and
reverberate through time the oppression, and the freedom, felt by each and
every one of us, in whatever capacity we choose to conceive of ourselves."141
This is ultimately referable to the ratiocination of a conception of the individual
as rational, autonomous, and responsible to one's fellow human beings."
I have considered these notions of subjectivity that underpin international
law and international relations elsewhere.143 For present purposes, I am
concerned with the extent to which the subjectivity deployed by the articulation
of an international crime is rendered partial by its gendered nature. This
question of the partiality of the subject(s) of criminal law runs parallel to the
question of the partiality of the law's order and provides the second theme that
will run through Part III of this Article.
In this part, I have sketched out a brief history of war crimes and the
functions that they have served. Of particular interest was the notion that war
crimes serve aperformative function (as "theater") as retribution, as deterrence,
and more generally as the cathartic experience of absolution that is needed to
validate the order so grievously shattered by the violations prosecuted. On
closer examination, the significance of this "order" was seen to go beyond
rhetorical legitimation, while at the same time providing their normative telos.
I suggested that this notion of order was gendered in two important ways.
First, it was shown to be falsely premised on the absence of violence; in fact,
it depends greatly on particular notions of a "public" order defined through its
relationship with violence. Second, it affected the partiality of the subjects of
that order, defining a particular "public" morality within which those subjects
operate. In Part I, I apply this historical and theoretical analysis to the war
crime of rape, before evaluating the extent to which the prominence of that
crime has led to a reconsideration of notions of order in the Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia.
what did you expect?
Talons?
LEONARD COHEN, SELECTED PonMs, 1956-1968, at 122 (1969); cf. WniiAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act
5, sc. 2, in 15 THE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 173 (AMS Press 1970) (James 0. Halliwell ed.,
1861) ("I look down towards his feet-but that's a fable. If that thou be'st a devil, I cannot kill thee.").
140. Morgan, supra note 46, at 4.
141. Id. at 64.
142. See id. at 43.
143. See Chesterman, supra note 13.
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H. THE GENDER OF WAR CRIMES: RAPE IN WAR, RAPE AS WAR
I then told him that, in spite of my most diligent efforts, there would unquestionably be some
raping, and that I should like to have the details as early as possible so that the offenders
could properly be hanged.
-General George S. Patton Jr.144
Rape has long been an accepted concomitant of war, even if it has not
always been explicitly condoned: "Unquestionably there shall be some raping.
Unconscionable but nevertheless inevitable."145
And so, as Susan Brownmiller observes, it has been:
Rape has accompanied wars of religion: knights and pilgrims took time off for sexual assault
as they marched toward Constantinople in the First Crusade. Rape has accompanied wars of
revolution .... Rape was a weapon of terror as the German Huns marched through Belgium
in World War I. Rape was a weapon of revenge as the Russian Army marched to Berlin in
World War H.... Rape got out of hand-"regrettably," as the foreign minister was later to
say-when the Pakistani Army battled Bangladesh. Rape reared its head as a way to relieve
boredom as American GI's searched and destroyed in the highlands of Vietnam. 14
In this part, I briefly consider the history of rape in war. Given the
prevalence of rape and its explicit utilization as a policy of the war in former
Yugoslavia, I contextualize this by reference to the function that rape has played
in previous conflicts. Ultimately, this is reducible not to military strategy, but
rather to the conceptions of power that manifest and are valorized in war. From
this perspective, the problematic status of rape as a war crime in international
criminal law is more clearly understood as an inadequate attempt to grapple
with gendered power relations through the putatively asexual mechanism of the
law. Drawing on the analysis in Part II of international criminal law as
constituting a particular conception of order, rape is thus seen as marking the
scar between "public" and "private" order.
As I have argued in Part II, this "public" order operates within a highly
masculinist paradigm. In this part, then, I seek to interrogate these notions of
order and morality by reference to the silences that they gloss over, and the
voices they have not heard. I then critically examine the possibilities presented
by the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to overcome some of these
inadequacies.
A. Rape in War
The body of a raped woman becomes a ceremonial battlefield, a parade ground for the
victor's trooping of the colors. The act that is played out upon her is a message passed
between men-vivid proof of victory for one and loss and defeat for the other.
-Susan Brownmiller 47
144. GEORGE S. PATTON JR., WAR AS I KNEw IT 23 (1947), quoted in SUSAN BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 23 (1975).
145. BROw.LER, supra note 144, at 23 (discussing PATRON, iupra note 144).
146. Id. at 23-24.
147. Id. at 31.
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For many centuries, rape was seen as one of the spoils of war. In appealing
for recruits during the First Crusade, the Byzantine emperor Alexius is
supposed to have extolled the beauty of Greek women as an incentive to go to
war.'48 "Booty and beauty," as it later came to be called,' 49 was long associated
with success in battle-due as much to the opportunities presented by the
victorious army's marching through the defeated people's territory as it was to
the intimate relation between rape and the macho-military project of conquest.'1
This conception of the link between rape and conquest has had a corollary,
in that military leaders have used-or at least tolerated-prostitution as a means
of mollifying or maintaining troop morale, or alleviating boredom."' The
prevalence of brothels near a battle camp has often been linked to the
phenomenon of the camp follower, 52 but the prostitute, the "comfort
woman," 53 and the rape camp may be more properly seen as affirming different
modalities of the same power relations.Im
Historically, rape has also served a tactical function in war, notably as an
expression of the totality of victory.5 For the men of the conquered nation, the
rape of "their women" represented the ultimate humiliation, "a sexual coup de
grce":16 "[R]ape by a conqueror is compelling evidence of the conquered's
status of masculine impotence. Defense of women has long been a hallmark of
masculine pride, as possession of women has been a hallmark of masculine
success."1 57
The First World War marked a point of significant change in this use of
rape as an instrument of war.5 8 The German invasions of Belgium in August
1914 and of France the following September were accompanied by a campaign
148. See id. at 28.
149. See id. at 28-29. Brownmiller attributes the phrase to General Andrew Jackson, who coined it
in New Orleans during the War of 1812, referring to the English. See id; see also ROBN RELLY, THE
BRTSH AT THE GATES: THE NEw ORLEANS CAMPAIGN IN THE WAR OF 1812, at 265-66 (1974) (discussing
origin of phrase in Battle of New Orleans and historical disputes over phrase's source).
150. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 144, at 35; see also Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War, and
Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17 HuM. RTs. Q. 649,
659-62 (1995).
151. See Tompkins, supra note 70, at 864. A current example relates to the planned joint military
exercise between Australia and the United States that was to take place in Queensland, Australia during
Easter 1997 (unfortunately titled "Tandem Thrust").
152. See BROWNm1LuR, supra note 144, at 28.
153. See generally CHARLES TuTrL, THE COMFORT WOMEN: SEX SLAVES OF JAPAN'S IMPERIAL
FORCES (1995); Tong Yu, Reparations for Former Comfort Women of World War 1I, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J.
528 (1995).
154. Compare this account of a U.S. military sociologist at the end of the Second World War: "[Tihe
values associated with the ideal of virility play a determining role in holding the soldier's image of himself
and in creating his inner tensions and channels for their release." Henry Elkin, Aggressive and Erotic
Tendencies in Armay Life, 51 AM. J. Soc. 408, 410 (1946). That does not mean that every soldier rapes. But
it does mean that the construction of the soldier-or to express it differently, the subjective identity that
armies make available, by fusing certain cultural ideas of masculinity with a soldier's essence-is more
conducive to certain ways of behavior than others.
155. See Tompkins, supra note 70, at 859-61.
156. See BROWNmILER, supra note 144, at 31. In such circumstances, it is not uncommon for a
husband or father to be forced to watch the rape. See id. at 33; see also infra note 173.
157. Id. at 31.
158. See id. at 34-43; Niarchos, supra note 150, at 663.
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of terror that has been attributed by some commentators to the influence of
Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century military theorist.'5 9 By the end of 1914,
however, the strategies of warfare had changed radically; "modem" warfare
saw stationary trenches, barbed wire, machine guns, and gas replace the
traditional concept of the marching army.',, At approximately the same time,
the incidence of rape dramatically declined. 61 As well as the diminished
opportunities for rape presented by such warfare, this period also saw the
emergence of another new technique in battle: the scientific use of international
propaganda." Brownmiller documents the use of raped women in France and
Belgium as propaganda to spur on Allied troops and to strengthen domestic
support for the unconditional surrender of a foe at once cold, cruel, and
syphilitic." (This has continued to present times: Witness the Western media's
description of "the rape of Kuwait" in the buildup to the Gulf War.)
The Second World War saw another transformation in the utility of rape
as the logical extension of the masculine project of conquest. The identification
of Aryan superiority with male supremacy and the feminization of the Jews was
central to the Nazi ideology.164 Rape was an obvious manifestation of this
ideology, with the total humiliation and destruction of "inferior peoples" being
achieved in part through the manner in which men have traditionally
"conquered" women.6
The gendering of the relations between Aryans and their "Other,"
however, was at odds with the Nazi views on genetic purity. The contradictions
to which this gave rise when read against the Nuremberg race laws and the Nazi
claims to racial superiority are manifest in this passage from the memoirs of
Sala Pawlowicz, a survivor of Bergen-Belsen:
I was in a small office and the German had a long heavy whip in his hand. "You do n't know
how to obey . . . I'll show you. But I can't have you, scum, because you're Jewish, and
filthy. What a shame!" He swung the whip across my breasts. "Here's what you can have for
159. See BROWNMI.LER, supra note 144, at 34.
160. See HOBSBAWM, supra note 21, at 49-51 (discussing increasing brutality of modem warfare).
161. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 144, at 36.
162. See id. at 43-45. Similarly, Harold Lasswel discusses the propaganda value of rape from a
Freudian perspective:
These stories yield a crop of indignation against the fiendish perpetrators... and satisfy certain
powerful, hidden impulses. A young woman, ravished by the enemy, yields a secret satisfaction
to a host of vicarious ravishers on the other side of the border. Hence, perhaps, the popularity
and ubiquity of such stories.
HAROLD LASSWELL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR 82 (1927) (emphasis added).
163. See BROWNMmLER, supra note 144, at 38-43 (critically discussing NEWELL Dwirr HILUS,
GERMAN ATROCTmES: THEn NATURE AND PHILOsoPHY (1918)).
164. See EVA FIGES, PATRIARCHALATruDEs 121-24 (1970); KATE Ma.Er, SEXUAL PoLrrlcs
159-68 (1970).
165. See BROWNMi.ER, supra note 144, at 63. One of the brief passages in the Nuremberg Trials
that considers crimes against women includes the testimony of a survivor of Auschwitz and Revensbrflck,
Marie Claude Vaillant-Couturier. She describes a brothel that was set up for the SS, which the French
prosecutor interpreted to be part of a broader "system of demoralization and corruption." 6 TPTAL Op THi3
MAJoR WAR CPaiMNAMS, supra note 1, at 213-14 (quoting M. Charles Dubost, Deputy Chief Prosecutor
of French Republic); see also BROWNMa.Lm, supra note 144, at 64-78 (discussing unexamined instances
of rape by Allies during Second World War).
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being a dirty Jew-instead of me-this!" He lashed the whip again and again and I fainted .'6
It was the echoes of Nazism in the Serbian 67 policies of "ethnic cleansing" in
the former Yugoslavia that finally shocked the world into action." Catharine
MacKinnon has linked Serbian fascism's notions of racial purity to its
ideological debt to Nazism, with the "cleansing" of ethnicity through rape as
the logical extension of the Nazi conception of culture as genetic.169
In the context of the former Yugoslavia, then, rape has served a number of
discrete but interrelated functions. It is at once an instrument of the military
objective to drive populations from their homes"0 and the subject of widespread
political propaganda.' It is used as an instrument of fear as well as a means of
impregnating women (seen to be bearing children of the conqueror's
ethnicity)., 2 In this way, rape functions as both an intimate violation of a
woman and a grotesque public display of domination: The rape of the woman's
166. SALA PAwLOWICZ & KEVIN KLOSE, I WILL SuRvivE 41 (1962).
167. Despite the equivocation of much of the UN literature (anxious to avoid the appearance of
partisanship), it is broadly accepted that systematic rape in the former Yugoslavia was used first and on the
widest scale by the Serb forces in Bosnia in 1992-in particular by the irregular Bosnian Serb forces known
as the Chetniks (in Serbo-Croatian cetnik, from ceta, "band, troop, (military) division"). Bosnian Croats
then adopted the pattern in the spring of 1993, as they attempted to create an ethnically pure Croatian sector.
The forces of the predominantly Muslim government of Bosnia are also accused of atrocities, but not as an
instrument of government policy. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780, 251, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report of the
Commission of Experts] (discussing ethnic character of Bosnian and Serbian rapes); ALLEN, supra note 4,
at 42-43 (acknowledging that rape and other atrocities were committed by all sides, but suggesting Serbs
alone prescribed genocidal rape as offical policy); AMNESTY INT'L, BOSNiA-HE GoviNA: RAPES AND
SEXUAL ABUSE BY THE AtMED FORCES 1 (1993) (stating that "all sides ... have been guilty of [sexual]
misconduct"); Roy Gutman, Foreword to MASS RAPE, supra note 99, at ix, xi-xii (presenting experiences
of Bosnian rape victims). On the rape of Serbian women, see Alexandra Stiglmayer, The Rapes in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in MASS RAPE, supra note 99, at 82, 137-44.
168. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. On the significance of media reports of rape
in particular, see C. Carr, Battle Scars: Feminism and Nationalism Clash in the Balkans, VLLAGE VOICE,
July 13, 1993, at 25; Slavenka Drakulic, Mass Rape in Bosnia, Women Hide Behind a Wall of Silence,
NATION, Mar. 1, 1993, at 253; Roy Gutman, Mass Rape-Muslims Recall Serb Attacks, NEWSDAY, Aug.
23, 1992, at 5; Paul Lewis, Rape Was a Weapon of Serbs, UN Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1993, at Al;
William Pfaff, Invitation to War, FOREIGN An:., Summer 1993, at 97; Tom Post et al., A Pattern of Rape,
NEwSwEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 32.
169. See Catharine MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide and Women's Human Rights, in MASS RAPE, supra
note 99, at 183, 192.
170. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 167, 250(a).
171. See, e.g., United Nations, Security Council, European Community Investigative Mission into
the Treatment of Muslim Women in the Former Yugoslavia-Report to the European Community Foreign
Ministers, 20, U.N. Doc S/25240/Annex 1 (1993) ("[R]ape cannot be seen as accidental to the main
purpose of aggression but as a serving strategic purpose in itself."). The sexualization of politics is most
clearly seen in the links that are made between atrocities and patriotism. A woman who survived the Bucje
rape/death camp in Serbian-occupied Croatia described the making of her rape into nationalist pornography:
"In front of the camera, one beats you and the other-excuse me-fucks you, he puts his truncheon in you,
and he films all that .... We even had to sing Serbian songs ... in front of the camera." Catharine
MacKinnon, Turning Rape into Pornography. Postmodern Genocide, in MASS RAPE, supra note 99, at 73,
75. A Muslim soldier who observed a Serbian group committing a gang rape quoted the senior Serbian
officer of the group as saying: "She has to know that we are Chetniks. She has to know that this is our land.
She has to know that we're commanding, that this is our Greater Serbia, that it'll be like this for everyone
who doesn't listen." Id. at 79.
172. See ALLEN, supra note 4, at xiii; Stiglmayer, supra note 167, at 131-37; Tompkins, supra note
70, at 868.
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body symbolically represents the rape of the community itself.17 It is this
conscious and open use of pornography as war propaganda, in making
pornography of atrocities, that leads MacKinnon to observe that "this is perhaps
the first truly modem war."174
Although such an account in some way aids our attempt to comprehend the
scale of the atrocities-importantly, in terms that are linked to military
objectives 75-it still does not explain the brutality of many of the rapes that
have taken place. The Croatian journalist Ines Sabalic, for example, has
described atrocities of a quasi-ritualistic character, such as mutilation of the
raped female body by cutting off the breasts and slitting open the stomach. 176
It has been suggested that these orgies of rape must be seen as outbursts of a
culturally rooted contempt for women, lived out in times of crisis.1" The
legitimation of violence in times of war and the correlative magnification of
male sexuality in battle thus provide what Brownmiller describes as the "perfect
psychologic backdrop [for men] to give vent to their contempt for women."1 78
173. See Ruth Seifert, War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis, in MASS RAPE, supra note 99, at 54,
64. This is seen most clearly in the number of rapes that other members of the woman's family or communi-
ty are compelled to watch. See MacKinnon, supra note 171, at 80; Stiglmayer, supra note 167, at 82;
Tompkins, supra note 70, at 867; see also supra note 156.
174. MacKinnon, supra note 169, at 192; see ALLEN, supra note 4, at 34-35 (describing widespread
creation and distribution of pornography during war). MacKinnon documents a number of occasions in
which actual rapes of Muslim and Croatian women by Serbian soldiers were broadcast on the evening news
in Banja Luka (a Serbian-occupied city in western Bosnia-Herzegovina). In each case, the ethnic labels were
switched by means of switched clothing or (clumsily) dubbed sound. See MacKinnon, supra note 171, at
75-76. The use of the televised media by the regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb played a crucial role in
fanning the flames of the Serbo-Croatian conflict that came to swallow postwar Yugoslavia. Marco Altherr,
then head of the International Red Cross delegation in Yugoslavia, said he had never seen such effective
propaganda: "If you talk to them, the people on both sides are absolutely convinced that the other side is
intent on killing them. And it's all the result of propaganda." Paul Parin, Open Wounds:
Ethnopsychoanalytic Reflections on the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia, in MASS RAPE, supra note 99, at
35, 41.
175. "Whether a woman is raped by soldiers in her home or is held in a house with other women and
raped over and over again, she is raped with a political purpose." 2 HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN
BosN-HERzEGoviNA 21 (1993) (emphasis added).
176. See Seifert, supra note 173, at 65 (discussing Ines Sabalic, Nirgends erwifhnt-doch aiberall
geschehen: Ein Bericht aus Zagreb, PUBLIKATION DER GLEICHSTELLUNGESTELLE DER LANDESHAUPSTADT
(1992)). Other accounts incorporate the use of religious iconography in the rape scene. See, e.g.,
MacKinnon, supra note 171, at 80. Brownmiller has described the infamous My Lai massacre: "She was
spread-eagled, as if on display. She had an Ilth Brigade patch between her legs-as if it were some type
of display, some badge of honor." BROWNMILLER, supra note 144, at 109 (quoting helicopter door gunner
Ronald Ridenhour); see also Niarchos, supra note 150, at 665 (depicting rape victim nailed to board).
177. See Seifert, supra note 173, at 65. "Sadeta," a survivor from the Trnopolje camp, tried to
explain the actions of her Serbian rapists in this way: "Maybe that's their way of hurting Muslim women
and Croatian women, and the whole female race." Stiglmayer, supra note 167, at 96; see also Susan
Brownmiller, Making Female Bodies the Battlefield, NEwswEnn, Jan. 4, 1993, at 37, reprinted in MASS
RAPE, supra note 99, at 180. Brownmiller has argued that in the identity politics that have divided the
former Yugoslavia, "Balkan women, whatever their ethnic and religious background.., have been thrust
against their will into another identity. They are victims of rape in war." Id.
178. BROWNMni.ER, supra note 144, at27; see Tompkins, supra note 70, at 869-73 Oinking wartime
rape to fundamental societal hatred of women). Compare the following account of an incident that took place
during America's operations in Vietnam:
They were supposed to go after what they called a Viet Cong whore. They went into the village
and instead of capturing her, they raped her - every man raped her. As a matter of fact, one
man said to me later that it was the first time he had ever made love to a women with his boots
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This has given rise to the lexicological problem of naming events often
characterized as "genocidal rape," with neologisms such as "femicidal" rape79
and "gynocide" 180 being suggested.18'
The multiple origins, functions, and modes of the violence against women
are impossible to comprehend without this gendered context. In the next
section, I consider the legal responses that the international community has
adopted in response to this eroticization of violence, this violence as erotica.
B. Rape as a War Crime
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against
rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.
-Fourth Geneva Conventioni l
Until the Middle Ages, women in wartime had no more rights than any
other property that might be seized by the victor." This was largely consistent
with the legal status of women at the time; their rape was considered an injury
to the men from whom they were taken, rather than to themselves as human
beings."a4 The first legal protection accorded to women emerged during the
Hundred Years War (1337-1453), during which rapists became subject to
"capital punishment under national military codes, such as those of Richard II
(1385) and Henry V (1419). "185 By 1646, the "father" of international law,
Hugo Grotius, observed that the punishment of rape in war was "the law not of
on.... [A]t any rate, they raped the girl, and then, the last man to make love to her shot her
in the head.
ViETNAm VErERANs AGAiNSTTHEWAR, TBWINTER SOLDIERINVESIGATION: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN
WAR CIaUEs 29 (1972) (testimony of Sergeant Michael McClsker) (emphasis added). Tamara Tompkins
suggests that this failure to distinguish between rape and making love reflects "total indifference and
incomprehension of the true nature of this sexual encounter." See Tompkins, supra note 70, at 873.
179. See ALLEN, supra note 4, at xiii (quoting Asja Armanda, member of Croatian feminist group
Kareta).
180. See Niarchos, supra note 150, at 679.
181. See infra note 242 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of recognizing rape only by scale
of atrocity).
Another unsettling aspect of these atrocities is the number of reports of women raped by former
acquaintances. Stigimayer quotes "Hatiza," a survivor from the Trnopolje camp: "'And those are our
brothers, our true brothers,' she says sarcastically. 'I was in the camp, I was raped, and I still can't
understand that our friends are doing it, people who until yesterday were our friends. I'm thinking legal
conviction would be too good for such a bloodthirsty people.'" Stiglmayer, supra note 167, at 92-93. In
a number of accounts, the women who were raped state that men whom they knew were slightly less
aggressive than those who completely depersonalized them. See id. at 120, 141; see also Niarchos, supra
note 150, at 658 & nn.51-52; Tompkins, supra note 70, at 866-67. Precisely what drives men to rape their
former neighbors, ostensibly on the basis of their ethnicity, is beyond my comprehension and the scope of
this paper.
182. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]
(emphasis added).
183. See Niarchos, supra note 150, at 659-60.
184. See BROWNmILER, supra note 144, at 15.
185. Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
424, 425 (1993); see MERON, supra note 7, at 92; Niarchos, supra note 150, at 661.
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all nations, but of the better ones."186
The United States' Lieber Code of 1863 addressed rape in two distinct
ways: on the one hand, special protection was accorded to women by reference
to the "sacredness of domestic relations";"s on the other, rape was recognized
as a crime of violence.18 It was the former view that prevailed, with the 1874
Declaration of Brussels"89 and the 1907 Hague Regulations commanding respect
for "[flamily honour and rights."190 Such provisions may be construed to cover
rape-though they have seldom been so interpreted in practice.'91
"Rape" did not appear in the Nuremberg Charter or Judgment, apparently
being subsumed into the general category of "ill treatment of the civilian
population.""9 During the prosecution, however, there was some discussion of
rapes committed by German troops. " An example of the treatment these events
received warrants some examination:
I quote, "The Maquis had evacuated the town several days earlier... 54 women or
young girls from 13 to 50 years of age were raped by the maddened soldiers."
The Tribunal will forgive me ifI avoid citing the atrocious details which follow ....
A medical certificate from Doctor Nicolaides, who examined the women who were raped in
186. Niarchos, supra note 150, at 661. But cf. 1 THOMAS WALKER, A HISToRY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONs 306 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1899) (arguing that municipal customs should not be mistaken for
Natural Law).
187. Lieber Code, supra note 16, art. 37 ("The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile
countries occupied by them, religion and morality;... the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of
women; and the sacredness ofdomestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.")
(emphasis added).
188. See id. art. 44. Article 44 states:
All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of
property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after
taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are
prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate
for the gravity of the offense.
Id. (emphasis added).
189. See Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Aug. 27, 1874, art. 38, reprinted
in LAw OFNAR, supra note 16, at 194, 200 [hereinafter Declaration of Brussels] (never entered into force).
190. See Second Hague, IV, supra note 18, art. 46.
191. See Meron, supra note 185, at 425. The commission formed to investigate war crimes in the
First World War included rape and forced prostitution as crimes. See Commission on the Responsibility of
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace
Conference, Mar. 29, 1919, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'LL. 95, 114 (1920). As has been discussed above,
the trials that eventually followed the war were far from satisfactory. See supra notes 27-33 and
accompanying text.
192. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRMINALS, supra note 1, at 475; Cf GLUECK, supra note 40, at
5 (referring to "wholesale deeds of theft, murder, rapine and enslavement" committed by German forces).
Rape was included as a crime against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10, the law adopted by the
occupying powers as a charter for German domestic trials of war crimes. See 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BFORE THm NutRNBERO M=rARY TRmUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCtL LAW No. 10, at xvii (1946). This
precedent was not followed in the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, which listed rape as a war crime
but not as constituting a grave breach subject to universal jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes
196-201. On the use of rape in Europe during the Second World War, see supra text accompanying notes
164-66.
Rape was prosecuted as a crime by the Tokyo Tribunal. See 1 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE
IurERNAToNAL MmuARY TRiBUNAL FORTHE FAR EAST 385 (B.V.A. R6ling & C.F. Ruter eds., 1977); 2
id. at 971-72; see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 144, at 57-63; Niarchos, supra note 150, at 666.
193. See 6 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRMNAM, supra note 1, at 404-07; 7 id. at 456-57.
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this region.
I will pass on. 19
In this way, Brownmiller argues, the French prosecutor used the "standard
censoring mechanism that men employ when dealing with the rape of
women."
195
Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which now constitute the core rules
of international humanitarian law applicable in international armed conflicts,'96
rape is not listed as a grave breach."' The most immediate implication of this
is that rape is not subject to universal jurisdiction.1 9 The International
Commission of the Red Cross and the U.S. State Department have recently
declared that rape is a grave breach under article 147 (relating to "torture or
inhumane treatment")." 9 However, it is hardly satisfactory that this proposition
should rest on interpretation alone.
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which mandates that women
be protected from "any attack on their honour, "I explicitly addresses rape.
The commentary explains that "women, whatever their nationality, race,
religious beliefs, age, marital status or social condition have an absolute right
to respect for their honour and their modesty, in short, for their dignity as
women."2°0 The possibility of systematic rape being characterized as an attack
194. 6 id. at 405 (statement of M. Dubost, French Prosecutor).
195. BROwNMImLER, supra note 144, at 53.
196. See Report of the Secretary General, supra note 89, 37.
197. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 147. But see Frangoise Krill, The Protec-
tion of Women in International Humanitarian Law, 49 INT'L Rm¢. RED CROSS 337, 341 (1985) (showing that
rape was given additional protection, though not termed grave breach). The Conventions list particularly
serious violations as "grave breaches" or war crimes. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug.
12, 1949, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 182, art. 147. See generally Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed
Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 Micr. J. INT'L L. 783 (1995) (describing grave breaches in general
and showing relevance to war in former Yugoslavia).
198. States parties are obliged to bring persons accused of having committed grave breaches to trial,
regardless of where the alleged acts took place and the nationality of the accused or the victim. See First
Geneva Convention, supra note 197, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 197, art. 50; Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 197, art. 129; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 146. There
is an obligation to suppress simple breaches, but the means of prosecution are left to the parties' discretion.
See Sharon Healey, Prosecuting Rape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 327, 335 (1995).
199. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Aide-Mdmoire (Dec. 3, 1992), quoted in Meron,
supra note 185, at 426-27; Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 167, 105.
200. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 27 (emphasis added).
201. COMMENTARYONIV GENEVA CONVENTIONRELATIVETO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS
IN TIME OF ,VAR 205 (Jean S. Pictet et al. eds., 1958), quoted in Niarchos, supra note 150, at 674. The
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions similarly deal with rape as a crime against "dignity." This is most
apparent in Protocol II, which proscribes certain acts against non-combatants in non-international armed
conflicts, including (e) "[O]utrages uponpersonal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,
rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault." Protocol Additional to the Geneva
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on "modesty" is, of course, obscene.' Such references to injuries to honor and
modesty (and to a lesser extent to dignity) mask the violent nature of the
crime.' At the same time, such a conception of rape is contingent upon
hierarchized gender relations that naturalize the experiences of women as
victims.
The legal response to rape in war has thus been dominated by two
overlapping trends: the effacement of the feminine subject, and her selective
appropriation into the discourse of war crimes as the bearer of essentialized
feminine virtues (protecting men's interests in "their" women). Given the
gendered context of rape in war discussed in the previous section, discussing
these issues in the purportedly asexual language of legal objectivity has often
served to expunge women's experiences completely from the public record.2"
Although some feminists have argued that this is largely a product of the
predominance of men in the institutions of both war and law,0 5 I argue that this
only partially explains the problem. Bound up with the "sea of male faces" 0
6
are power relations which, although gendered, go beyond the sex of those in
power.2 7
In this first sense, the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia marks an
ambiguous step forward. It includes two female judges, but they are only two
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, opened for signature June 8, 1977, art. 4(2)(e), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]
(entered into force 1978) (emphasis added). This provision has been adopted in the most recent draft of the
ILC's Code of Crimes which is to be tabled at the 1996 session of the General Assembly. See Report of the
International Law Commission on its Forty-Eighth Session (forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter ILC Report
1996]. It is listed in article 20, "War Crimes," but is restricted to armed conflict not of an international
character. Id. art. 20(f)(v). Article 20(d), which is not so limited, also criminalizes "outrages upon personal
dignity in violation of international humanitarian law, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."
Arguably, this constitutes an extension of international humanitarian law, applying the Protocol II standards
to non-international armed conflict. Protocol 1, which applies specifically to international armed conflicts,
demands that "[w]omen be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of
indecent assault." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (entered into force 1978) (emphasis added).
202. See Copelon, supra note 100, at 249 (arguing that conceptualizing rape as attack against honor
is problematic); see also Niarchos, supra note 150, at 674. Such a characterization also perpetuates the
notion that raped women are "soiled" or disgraced-a problem that augments the difficulties of postwar
reconstruction. See BROWNmLLER, supra note 144, at 54 (describing postwar inquiry into Rape of
Nanking).
203. See Copelon, supra note 100, at 249.
204. This appears to be happening to the experiences of many Rwandan women-perhaps doubly
excluded through the intersection of gender and race. See Copelon, supra note 100, at 245 n.11 (citing
newspaper articles on rape in Rwanda).
205. See, e.g., Charlesworth et al., supra note 128, at 621-25. But see Fernando R. Tes6n, Feminism
and International Law: A Reply, 33 VA. J. INr'L L. 647, 655 (1993) (arguing that breadth and heterogeneity
of international law renders "great bulk of international legal rules" gender neutral). Tes6n thereby misses
the point that it is largely this "neutrality" which serves to maintain (gender) power imbalances.
206. Niarchos, supra note 150, at 680.
207. Cy. Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?, 28
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 507 (1990) (exploring limitations on ability of women judges fundamentally to change
law).
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of eleven. 208 The Tribunal's Statute explicitly acknowledges the criminality of
rape, but none of the original nominees for Chief Prosecutor was a woman, nor
was expertise in the issue of violence against women a criterion of selection.'
This has now changed somewhat with the recent appointment of Canadian
Justice Louise Arbour after Justice Richard Goldstone resigned.210 At the time
of this writing, there was no indication as to how this change would affect the
conduct of the prosecution.
At an allied but deeper level, however, rape as it is appropriated by the
Tribunal is sterilized in two ways. First, rape as a crime is necessarily
translated into the masculine discourse of law and into the masculine discourse
of order through law. Second, the inclusion of some rapes as an act in the
"public" (politico-legal) sphere implicitly excludes other rapes that remain
"private" (and thus invalid). This double-move of inclusion and exclusion
effects a transformation on the experiences of women in the former Yugoslavia,
imposing a definition that depends not on experience but on the legally
validating circumstances in which that experience obtains a context.
Significantly, that context is an exercise in border demarcation, delimited by
specific conceptions of order (as international peace and security) and power (as
the "public" exercise of instrumental force).
1. Rape, Law, and Order
Rape is explicitly included in article 5(g) of the Statute of the Tribunal as
a "Crime Against Humanity," 211 and it is under this article that over twenty
208. See ELEC1ON OF JUDGES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE
TERRrroRY OF TE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991, at 1-2, U.N. Doe. A/47/1006 (1993). The General
Assembly considered 22 candidates for the 11 positions. The only two women to apply (one from Costa
Rica, the other from the United States) were both selected.
209. See Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualising Crimes Against Women in 7me of
War, in MASS RAPE, supra note 99, at 218 n.43. Partly in response, women's organizations have run
parallel trials over which they have a greater degree of control. Notably, two suits have been filed against
the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute. See Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 U.S. 2524 (1996); see also Michele Brandt, Comment, Doe v.
Karadzic: Redressing Non-State Acts of Gender-Specific Abuse Under the Alien Tort Statute, 79 MINN. L.
REv. 1413 (1995) (criticizing Karadzic for failure to apply international norms); Yolanda Wu, Genocidal
Rape in Bosnia: Redress in United States Courts Under the Allen Tort Claims Act, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
101, 103 (1993) (arguing that acceptance of plainfiffs' arguments in Alien Tort Claims Act suits would "add
weight to the claim that rape is a human rights violation"); cf. G.A. Res. 49/205, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
94th plen. mtg., at 9, U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/205 (1994) (urging Chief Prosecutor "to consider the
appointment to his office of experts in the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence"); G.A. Res. 48/153,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/153 (1994) (recommending such appointments).
210. See S.C. Res. 1047, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3637th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/Res/1047 (1996)
(appointing Arbour as prosecutor). The appointment took effect on October 1, 1996.
211. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since
1991, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
art. 5(g), U.N. Doc S/25704/Annex (1993) [hereinafter Statute of the Tribunal].
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men have been charged.212 Rape is nevertheless potentially relevant to all four
articles that grant subject matter jurisdiction to the Tribunal. 213 Of primary
interest here, however, is the characterization of rape as a crime that has
revisited the tensions exhibited in the Lieber Code.21 4
The historical treatment of rape as a crime against women's "honor" (and
hence against men's investment in female subjectivity) continues to inform the
law that the Tribunal is empowered to adjudicate. 2t Recognizing the inadequacy
of such a limited approach, UN Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki has
emphasized that rape is primarily a crime of violence: "Rape is an abuse of
power and control in which the rapist seeks to humiliate, shame, embarrass,
degrade and terrify the victim. The primary objective is to exercise power and
control over another person." 216 As well as affirming the essentially violent
nature of rape, this definition also rejects the view that rape is merely an
extension of "natural" sexual relations between women and men,217 or
something "extracurricular" to the waging of war.2 t8
Although this reconceptualization of rape as violence is a positive step, the
status of rape as a crime independent of other violations remains unclear. The
idea that rape is essentially a "private" act-only constituting a "valid"
international crime when linked to another more "serious" offense or when
explicitly tied to "public" policy-has also been imported into the jurisprudence
of the Tribunal. Sir Ninian Stephen, one of the Tribunal's eleven judges,
described the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as follows: "We don't have
jurisdiction in respect of rape, for example, but if it occurs as a crime against
humanity-as part of ethnic cleansing, for instance-then clearly it is within our
jurisdiction. "219
Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal grants jurisdiction to prosecute
persons responsible for the crime of rape as a crime against humanity, subject
to two limitations: the crime must be committed "in armed conflict, whether
international or internal in character," and it must be "directed against any
civilian population. "' The first requirement appears to be at odds with the
212. See Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusan Tadic & Goran Borovnica, I.T.-94-1, Indictment 3,
para. 4.4 (1995), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1028, 1030 (1995); The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Zeljko
Mealdc and Others, I.T.-95-4, Indictment 2, paras. 22.4, 22.7, 22.10. 22.13, 22.16, 25.4, 26.4, 30.4
(1995), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1013, 1020-26 (1995). In addition, eight Serbs have been charged with
raping and torturing Muslim women in the southeastern Bosnian town of Foca between the Spring of 1992
and early 1993. See War Crimes Tribunal Charges Eight Serbs with Rape, REuTMS, June 27, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuters World Service File.
213. See, e.g., Niarchos, supra note 150, at 681-82.
214. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 167, 105.
216. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted
by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to
Commission Resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992, U.N. ESCOR 4th Comm., 49th Sess., Annex II,
para. 49, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1993150 (1993) [hereinafter Mazowiecki Report].
217. But see Allen, supra note 4, at 120 (criticizing Mazowiecki's definition of rape for failing "to
avoid naturalized notions of male supremacy.").
218. See MacKinnon, supra note 171, at 80.
219. Abigail Hansen, Breaking the Cycle of iolence, 31 AuSmAuAN LAw. 1, 1 (1996).
220. Statute ofthe Tribunal, supra note 211, art. 5, 32 I.L.M. at 1193-94.
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definition in the Secretary General's report, which did not link crimes against
humanity to armed conflict." Academics have argued that it should be
understood as a jurisdictional limitation on the Tribunal, not as a codification
of crimes against humanity.'m This would be consistent with the Secretary
General's position that the life span of the International Tribunal "would be
linked to the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia. "I This also appears to accord with the
position outlined by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine K.
Albright, who stated that article 5 "applies to all acts listed in that article, when
committed... during a period of armed conflict in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. "4
The second requirement is of more concern here, as it requires the crime
to be committed "as part of an overall policy of persecution based on ethnic or
religious grounds against a civilian population."' The need for an identifiable
(state) policy in particular is at odds with the experiences of women raped in
previous wars.' In addition, the requirement that such a policy be directed
against a population on the basis of ethnicity or religion fails to account for
much of the feminist scholarship on rape in war that suggests this is really a
crime directed against women. 7
The widespread and reliable reports of systematic rape in the former
Yugoslavia have been interpreted as demonstrating a systematicness that is often
221. The Report states:
47. Crimes against humanity are aimed at any civilian population and are prohibited regardless
of whether they are committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character.
48. In the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, such inhumane acts have taken the
form of so-called "ethnic cleansing" and widespread and systematic rape and other forms of
sexual assault, including enforced prostitution.
Report of the Secretary General, supra note 89, 47-48, 32 I.L.M. at 1173; see also Healey, supra note
198, at 355.
222. See, e.g., Healey, supra note 198, at 355; O'Brien, supra note 82, at 650-51; cf. BAssIoums,
supra note 6, at 191 (arguing that crimes against humanity need not be linked to actual combat).
223. Report of the Secretary General, supra note 89, 28, 32 I.L.M. at 1169.
224. Healey, supra note 198, at 356. This position is further liberalized in the International Law
Commission's Draft Code of Crimes, which defines systematic or mass violations of human rights regardless
of the circumstances in which they are perpetrated. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work
ofIts Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991); see
McCormack & Simpson, supra note 59, at 15; cf Preparatory Committee on International Criminal Court
Concludes First Session, supra note 58, at 4 (emphasizing that crimes adjudicated by proposed court be
clearly enumerated criminal violations of customary international law). In the most recent draft of the Code
of Crimes (to be tabled at the General Assembly in November 1996), article 18 establishes two general
conditions that must be satisfied for a prohibited act to qualify as a crime against humanity: the act must be
"committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale," and it must be "instigated or directed by a
Government or by any organization or group." ILC Report 1996, supra note 201, at 93. Paragraph (j) lists
"rape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse" as crimes. Id. at 94. Rape was included as
a crime specifically in response to events in the former Yugoslavia and to General Assembly resolutions
condemning rape as a crime against humanity under certain circumstances. Id. at 102 (citing G.A. Res.
50/192, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., 99th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/50/192 (1996)).
225. Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 167, 107; cf Report of the Secretary
General, supra note 89, 48, 32 I.L.M. at 1173; BAssiout,, supra note 6, at 248.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 147-74.
227. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
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connected to the policy of ethnic cleansing. m But it remains unclear precisely
to what extent the rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina were in response to orders from
Serbia. 9 Rapists have claimed to be acting under orders, with some women
also stating that the rapes were directed as a policy.z 0 Even if such reports are
accepted, it is not known how high up these orders may reach. 131 At the very
least, Serbian leaders appear to have done nothing to punish or stop the
rapes-inaction which, when combined with the propaganda about the
"fundamentalist Muslims" and "fascist Croats" who must be driven out and
annihilated, amounts to complicity in or encouragement of the actions of the
Chetniks. 2
In contrast to previous characterizations of rape in times of war,
MacKinnon has written that this is not rape out of control, but rape under
control.33 This is, of course, precisely what brought the question of rape into
the international arena, and yet there is a substantial danger that this "public"
face of rape will delineate the extent to which it will be acknowledged as a
"valid" international crime. By defining certain rapes as public acts, this act of
inclusion implicitly operates to exclude other rapes (those not referable to state
policy). It is clearly necessary to restrict in some way the crimes justiciable
before an international tribunal. But by drawing this line down the middle of
rape-by reference not to women's experiences but to the translatability of those
experiences into the male-dominated public sphere of state policy-these rules
of justiciability do not merely exclude certain experiences, but also mold others
into suitable "stories" for male consumption. Similar problems emerge in
conceiving of systematic rape as a form of genocide.'
Attempts to characterize rape as torture also have failed, despite evidence
228. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 167, 244-50.
229. The Commission of Experts suggests that although some reported cases are individual or group
conduct, "many more seem to be a part of an overall pattern." Final Report of the Commission of Experts,
supra note 167, 252. Rapes that take place while the woman is in detention in particular "do not appear
to be random, and they indicate at least a policy of encouraging rape supported by the deliberate failure of
camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the personnel under their
authority." Id.
230. See Gutman, supra note 167; Stiglmayer, supra note 167, at 160-61; Roy Gutman, Rape
Camps: Evidence Serb Leaders in Bosnia OKd Attacks, NEwsDAY, Apr. 19, 1993, at 5.
231. According to the Commission of Experts:
These patterns strongly suggest that a systematic policy existed in certain areas, but it remains
to be proven whether such an overall policy existed which was to apply to all non-Serbs. It is
clear that some level of organization and group activity was required to carry out many of the
alleged rapes.
Final Report of the Commission of Erperts, supra note 167, 253.
232. See Stigimayer, supra note 167, at 161. For an explanation of the term "Chetnik," see supra
note 167.
233. See MacKinnon, supra note 169, at 190.
234. See G.A. Res. 49/205, supra note 209, pmbl., para. 8; see also Elizabeth Kohn, Rape as a
Weapon of War: Women's Human Rights During the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 24 GOuDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 199, 206-08 (1994); cf supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text. See generally John Webb,
Genocide Treaty-Ethnic Cleansing-Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Genocide
Convention to Alleged Crimes in the former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. IN'L & CoMP. L. 377 (1993) (describing
and discussing Genocide Treaty on Yugoslavia).
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that it is commonly used to this end. 5 Interestingly, the early indictments
characterized only one offense as torture: the gruesome (but much publicized)
Tadic case, in which it is alleged that two prisoners were forced to restrain and
bite off the testicle of another prisoner who subsequently bled to death. 6 What
makes this sexual mutilation torture, when the repeated rape of women held in
a detention center is not? 7 As Rhonda Copelon suggests, it is hard not to
attribute it to the sex of the decisionmakers and their ability to empathize only
with the male experience of sexual abuse. 8 This distinction is repeated in
relation to beatings (including kicking in the testicles) which are characterized
as causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 9 while repeated
rape is viewed only as wilfully causing great suffering.' °
Arguably, the most appropriate formulation of the crime of rape is as a
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions-a crime regardless of its scale or link
to an overarching policy." x Where rape is committed on a mass scale, or is the
subject of orchestrated policy, this added dimension may be recognized by
designating and prosecuting it as a crime against humanity. 2  Where it is used
as a tool of genocide, or as a form of torture, it is appropriate to characterize
it as such.
The danger of what has happened to rape in the context of the former
Yugoslavia is that by emphasising the scale of the atrocity-the explicit and
systematic use of rape as a tool of ethnic cleansing-the particularity of the
crime becomes lost in the masculine discourse of public order. Rape is thus
constituted as a public act that avoids the problems of gender specificity
attendant to its conceptualization as a crime against a woman's "honor." But in
so doing, precisely the opposite problem emerges: Women's experiences,
though no longer ignored, become subsumed in the discourse of order through
law. And in such a world view, gender is rendered invisible once more.
235. See Katherine Lusby, Hearing the Invisible Women of Political Rape: Using Oppositional
Narrative to Tell a New War Story, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 911, 938-39 (1995); see also Charlesworth et al.,
supra note 128, at 627-29.
236. See Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusan Tadic & Goran Borovnica, I.T.-94-1, Indictment 3,
para. 2.6; see also Robert Block & Peter Ellingsen, Genocide, THE AGE (Melbourne), June 10, 1995
(Saturday Extra), at 1.
237. See, e.g., Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 167, 229.
238. See Copelon, supra note 100, at 256. Another important factor is that the damage of rape is
largely unseen, with physical damage often internal, and the psychological damage occurring in silence.
239. See Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Zeljko Meakic, I.T.-95-4, Indictment 4, paras. 20.2, 24.2,
29.2.
240. See id. Note that willfully causing great suffering is a "grave breach" under the Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 182, art. 147.
241. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text. As I have stated above, however, this demands
some liberal interpretation of the text. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. In particular, such an
interpretation seems to go against the interpretation principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius [the
inclusion of one means the exclusion of the other], given that rape does appear in article 27 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, supra note 182, and not in article 147 (which lists grave breaches). See supra notes
198-201 and accompanying text.
242. See Dorothy Thomas & Regan Ralph, Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity,
SAIS REvmW, Winter-Spring 1994, at 81, 84, excerpted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
1070 (Henry Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996).
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2. The Invisibility of Gender
Early concerns that the rapes in the former Yugoslavia would go unnoticed
have now eased, but they have been replaced by fears that the exaggeration of
the distinctive features of genocidal rape will obscure the atrocity of "common"
rape.4 3 The elision of rape and genocide, for example, introduces the danger
that women's experiences will themselves be elided into the discourse of
genocide.
Arguably, this is merely referable to the fact that the discourse of human
rights has never included women's rights, either as a corollary or as an aspect
of the rights that women are accorded in their other capacities (as Jewish,
Argentinian, Honduran, etc.).4 This effacement of women's rights happens in
two distinct ways. When what happens to a woman also happens to a man, a
woman's suffering "has the dignity, and her death the honor, of a crime against
humanity" because she is violated in a way comparable and comprehensible to
a man. But when a woman suffers as a woman-when what was done to her
"smells of sex ... humanity is not violated."2 45
As Catherine MacKinnon further explains, "what is done to women is
either too specific to women to be seen as human or too generic to human
beings to be seen as specific to women. "246 In this light, Beverly Allen provides
an alternative formulation of the sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia by
focusing on the importance of forced impregnation as an instrument of
genocide. Seeking to avoid the identification of the victim as "naturally"
female, and the attendant problems of using this reductive category to define
rape as a crime that happens to women, she argues that genocidal rape may be
seen as a crime of biological warfare.47 Here she draws a distinction between
the rape of women based on sex and based on reproductive capacity.248 This
emphasizes the universalizing specificity of the crime in human biological
systems. 9 Such a conception stresses the seriousness of the crime, the violent
crime of rape being distinguished from traditional contexts that limit it to
something that "often, and therefore 'naturally,' happens to women.""'° The
problem with such an approach is that it is precisely this distinction from
243. See Copelon, supra note 100, at 259; Thomas & Ralph, supra note 242, at 1070.
244. See MacKinnon, supra note 169, at 183.
245. Id. at 184.
246. Id.
247. See ALLEN, supra note 4, at 121-32.
248. See id. at 121-22.
249. See id. at 138. Allen also has noted:
Thus the victim is identified not in a culturally variable way as only as "woman," nor in a
biologically deterministic way as only "female." By identifying the individual victim instead as
a person capable of gestating a pregnancy, the notion of genocidal rape as biological warfare
implicitly universalizes the victim, so that any human being with any biological specificity,
which of course includes all of us, is potentially victimized.
250. Id. at 139.
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"traditional contexts" that risks elision of the experiences of those women not
raped as part of forced pregnancy drives.
What is required, then, is a perspective that acknowledges the specific
horror of Bosnia without appropriating women's experiences. Here the essential
duality of the crime of rape must be recognized as the intersection of ethnic
violence and gender violence." Crucially, the public face of rape must not
obscure its inherent misogyny.' 2
There are positive signs that gender concerns are being taken into account
in the Tribunal. Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki has stressed the two-sided
nature of rape in the former Yugoslavia as both an attack on the individual
woman and a method of "ethnic cleansing" intended to "humiliate, shame,
degrade, and terrify the entire ethnic group."153 The Tribunal's rules of
procedure have been designed in the hope of being sensitive to the trauma
experienced by raped women who are forced to confront the accused.' But in
what is ultimately seen as the most important forum of the trial-the appropriate
indictment (and conviction) of war criminals-it is not clear that those women's
stories will reach the public arena intact. 5
Obviously, a conclusion on the Tribunal's treatment of rape would be
premature. In the next and final section, I restrict myself to a reconciliation of
the parallel themes pursued in this Article and a possible reconstruction of war
crimes that may prove more useful in promoting and protecting women's
(human) rights than existing structures.
C. Rape as War
Xenophobia and misogyny merge here; ethnic hatred is sexualized; bigotry becomes orgasm.
-Catharine MacKinnon?
The "problem" that rape in war presents to the international legal order,
then, does not lie merely in the unwillingness of men to recognize the suffering
of women. Instead, many of the problems that rape as a war crime presents are
referable to the structure and functions of international criminal law more
251. See Copelon, supra note 100, at 261.
252. See Tompkins, supra note 70, at 873-74.
253. See Mazowiecki Report, supra note 216, 85.
254. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia,
rr/32/Rev.3 (1995); see generally Jennifer Green et al., Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and
Other Gender-based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A
Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5 HASTINGS WoMEN's L.J. 171 (1994); Alex Lakatos, Evaluating the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses'
Needs Against Defendants' Rights, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 909 (1995); Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal:
Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 AM. J. INT' L. 235 (1996); cf. Howard Levie, The Statute
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look at the
Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 18 &n.87 (1995).
255. An obscene twist in this context is found in the persistent claims that UN troops are guilty of
raping those they are there to protect. See MacKinnon, supra note 169, at 192; UN Treachery, Ms.,
Jan./Feb. 1994, at 16; see also ENLOE, THE MORNING AFirER, supra note 127, at 188 (discussing rape of
female U.S. soldiers by male U.S. soldiers during Persian Gulf War).
256. MacKinnon, supra note 171, at 75.
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generally. As I argued in Part II, this structure is tied to particular notions of
order, and the protection of a certain form of "public" morality. In many ways,
the experiences of women raped in war have fallen through the cracks in this
account of the crimes that take place during hostilities. Despite the presence of
rape in a variety of forms, women's experiences are commonly silenced or
marginalized as irrelevant to the public discourse of war (as organized disorder)
and the consequent restructuring of order through law. In other ways, their
stories are appropriated to support a military project (the vileness of the enemy
troops, or the defense of "our" women) and affirm the masculinity needed to
construct a "good" soldier.
In this sense, the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia marks a watershed in
that it has given unprecedented prominence to the crime of rape-both in the
clear recognition of its status as a crime against humanity, 2 7 and in the
indictment of men charged exclusively with crimes against womenY 8
Nevertheless, as I have argued, this is at the very least an ambiguous watershed
in terms of what it might mean for the advancement of women's (human) rights
in the future. The former Yugoslavia has been remarkable, not merely for the
horrific way in which rape has been explicitly used as a "public" policy, 9 but
also for the media coverage of the "private" suffering that so stirred
international opinion.'
To recognize the violence of rape as an act at once private and public,
"domestic" and international, demands an understanding of the artificiality of
the lines that demarcate these boundaries. At the same time, however, it
demands that one acknowledge the sexualization of war: Rape is not merely an
aberration in times of war, but an extension of the power lust on which war
depends. If we try to ignore gender-the social constructions of "femininity"
and "masculinity" and the relations between them-it becomes impossible to
explain how our conceptions of order have become so tied to militarism.261
As I argued in Part III, the primary difficulty here lies in the failure to
conceive of such crimes as crimes against women. In attempting to comprehend
in legal form crimes that define the artificial boundary between public order and
private experience, it is necessary to call that boundary itself into question.
Absent a reconceptualization of masculinity and femininity in war, and of the
ways in which such constructions affirm and legitimate "normal domestic"
relations, efforts to open up the discourse of international criminal law to
women's experiences in war will be piecemeal and threatened by tokenism.
257. See supra notes 211-27 and accompanying text.
258. See War Crimes Tribunal Charges Eight Serbs with Rape, supra note 212.
259. See supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. On the importance of the role of the media, see
supra note 168.
261. See ENLOE, THEMORNmNG AFTER, supra note 127, at 228-61; see also ENLOE, supra note 129.
For a discussion of the ways in which the laws of war have served to legitimate violence more generally,
see Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Lmvs of
War, 35 HARV. IN'L L.J. 49 (1994); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence:
A CriticalAnalysis of the Gulf War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387 (1994).
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What, then, does justice demand in the context of the former Yugoslavia?
How can one "do justice" to experiences that have shocked the world?
One approach, which would not demand the dismantling of these
structures, would be to conceive of a new form of crime that adopts, even as
it transgresses, these boundaries. In contradistinction to the current treatment
of rape, such an approach would have to focus on the importance of the
gendered motivations behind the crime, while avoiding the appropriation of
those motivations for other masculinist ends in the macho-military project of
conquest. Unlike the crime of biological warfare that Allen has imagined, this
approach should not value the experiences of individual women only by
reference to their part in the totality. 2 In MacKinnon's argot, it is necessary
to avoid the Scylla of specificity and the Charybdis of generality.2"
With this caveat in mind, some feminists have suggested the
reconceptualization of the mass rapes in the former Yugoslavia as persecution
based on gender, and the establishment of an independent category of crimes
against humanity to reflect this.' In the same way that the Holocaust led to the
crystallization of the concept of crimes against humanity (and linked it to
religious and ethnic genocide), the international outrage at the suffering of
women in the former Yugoslavia may present the necessary conditions for a
similar transformation of international criminal law.
The conservatism of the Tribunal to date suggests that such a radical step
is unlikely." Although an extension of the categories of persecution is
intellectually plausible, the notion of criminalizing gender-based persecution is
entirely at odds with the function war crimes have played in the past. The order
that war crimes have historically reinforced is one that defines a
community-the state, the nation-or affirms the subjectivity of an individual
(implicitly ungendered-that is, masculine).' Gender-based persecution
262. See supra notes 247-50.
263. See supra text accompanying note 246.
264. See Copelon, supra note 100, at 261.
265. The Secretary General's report pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808 stated that the
application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege required the International Tribunal to "apply rules of
international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problems of
adherence by some but not all states to specific conventions does not arise." Report of the Secretary
General, supra note 89, 34. This is consistent with paragraph 29, which points out that the Security
Council is not purporting to "legislate," but merely to apply existing international humanitarian law. It is
precisely this basis of "legitimacy" that I am calling into question in this paper. See also supra text
accompanying note 219 (remarks of Sir Ninian Stephen); cf supra note 224 (discussion of ILC's most recent
Draft Code of Crimes).
266. See supra Section lI.C. Similarly, the concept of persecution in refugee law is generally
restricted to traditionally "political" bases (which do not include gender). The categories recognized under
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. l(A)(2), 189
U.N.T.S. 137, 152 (entered into force 1954) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 (entered into force 1967) are outlined inOFcE OFTHE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRIERIA FOR
DMTRMINING REFUG3EE STATus, U.N. Doe. HCR/IP/4 (1979). They include persecution based on race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See generally Karen
Bower, Recognizing Violence Against Women as Persecution on the Basis of Membership in a Particular
Social Group, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 173 (1993); Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the
Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625 (1993); Emily Love, Equality in Political Asylum
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(correctly) implies a destabilization of that order, calling into question the
modalities of power that legitimate the violence of the state both at peace and
at war.
Despite this immediate practical difficulty, as a theoretical move the idea
of gender-based persecution illustrates the extent to which gendered conceptions
of order become the norm. From this perspective, perhaps the most important
aspect of the current trials is the major role that women's organizations have
played in documenting the atrocities. These organizations have built networks
that use this information not to institutionalize women as victims, or as
instruments of propaganda to spur men on to more carnage, but to challenge the
peculiar ideas of masculinity that are utilized in war267 and that define peace
through its relation to a state of war.
IV. CONCLUSION
When evil-doing comes like falling rain, nobody calls out, "stop"
When crimes begin to pile up they become invisible.
When sufferings become unendurable the cries are no longer heard.
The cries, too, fall like rain in summer.
-Bertolt Brecht
The prosecution of war crimes-the invocation of law as validating order,
and the equation of law as order-marks a crucial point of contestation in the
contemporary international legal system. In this Article, I have sought to
examine this relationship between law and order both by reference to the
historical structure and function of war crimes and in the conjunctural moment
presented by events in the former Yugoslavia.
In Part II, I argued that this notion of order was premised not on the
absence of violence, but on a particular relationship with violence. More than
operating in defense of such an order, the law that is invoked is in fact
constitutive of that order and the subjects that operate with(in) it. In Part III, I
applied this historico-theoretical analysis to the ambiguous war crime of rape.
The coincidence of rape and war and the various ways in which states have
historically "dealt with" it demonstrates the extent to which this law as order
is gendered. At the same time, events in the former Yugoslavia also may have
suggested a way out of the legitimation cycle that until now has either ignored
or appropriated women's experiences. The notion of reclaiming women's
experiences through the legal construct of gender-based persecution-if not as
a legal then as apolitical category-suggests a possible reconceptualization of
gender-based harm.
There is, of course, a long way to go. No tribunal can truly "do justice"
Law: For a Legislative Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 133 (1994);
David Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20
CoLtJM. HUM. Rhrs. L. Rev. 203 (1988); Krishna R. Patel, Recognizing the Rape of Bosnian Women as
Gender-Based Persecution, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 929 (1994).
267. See Cynthia Enloe, Afterword to MASS RAPE, supra note 99, at 219, 220.
268. BERTOLT BREcHT, POEMS, 1913-1956, at 69 (John Willett & Ralph Manheim eds., 1976).
[Vol. 22: 299
1997] Gender of War Crimes 343
to the experiences of the rape camp. But insofar as war-crimes trials constitute
the morality that they seek to defend, there remains an obligation for such
public expositions of outrage to remain true to the experiences that form their
subject matter.
The redefinition of order, the implosion of incomplete categories of
experience, the preparedness to listen responsibly for silence even as "evil-
doing comes like falling rain"-this is the demand that is made of us by the
experiences of Yugoslavia.

